linux-kernel-test/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c

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/*
* Machine check handler.
*
* K8 parts Copyright 2002,2003 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
* Rest from unknown author(s).
* 2004 Andi Kleen. Rewrote most of it.
* Copyright 2008 Intel Corporation
* Author: Andi Kleen
*/
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/kobject.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/sysdev.h>
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
#include <asm/idle.h>
#include <asm/ipi.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include "mce-internal.h"
int mce_disabled __read_mostly;
#define MISC_MCELOG_MINOR 227
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
#define SPINUNIT 100 /* 100ns */
atomic_t mce_entry;
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned, mce_exception_count);
x86_64: mcelog tolerant level cleanup Background: The MCE handler has several paths that it can take, depending on various conditions of the MCE status and the value of the 'tolerant' knob. The exact semantics are not well defined and the code is a bit twisty. Description: This patch makes the MCE handler's behavior more clear by documenting the behavior for various 'tolerant' levels. It also fixes or enhances several small things in the handler. Specifically: * If RIPV is set it is not safe to restart, so set the 'no way out' flag rather than the 'kill it' flag. * Don't panic() on correctable MCEs. * If the _OVER bit is set *and* the _UC bit is set (meaning possibly dropped uncorrected errors), set the 'no way out' flag. * Use EIPV for testing whether an app can be killed (SIGBUS) rather than RIPV. According to docs, EIPV indicates that the error is related to the IP, while RIPV simply means the IP is valid to restart from. * Don't clear the MCi_STATUS registers until after the panic() path. This leaves the status bits set after the panic() so clever BIOSes can find them (and dumb BIOSes can do nothing). This patch also calls nonseekable_open() in mce_open (as suggested by akpm). Result: Tolerant levels behave almost identically to how they always have, but not it's well defined. There's a slightly higher chance of panic()ing when multiple errors happen (a good thing, IMHO). If you take an MBE and panic(), the error status bits are not cleared. Alternatives: None. Testing: I used software to inject correctable and uncorrectable errors. With tolerant = 3, the system usually survives. With tolerant = 2, the system usually panic()s (PCC) but not always. With tolerant = 1, the system always panic()s. When the system panic()s, the BIOS is able to detect that the cause of death was an MC4. I was not able to reproduce the case of a non-PCC error in userspace, with EIPV, with (tolerant < 3). That will be rare at best. Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:37 +00:00
/*
* Tolerant levels:
* 0: always panic on uncorrected errors, log corrected errors
* 1: panic or SIGBUS on uncorrected errors, log corrected errors
* 2: SIGBUS or log uncorrected errors (if possible), log corrected errors
* 3: never panic or SIGBUS, log all errors (for testing only)
*/
static int tolerant __read_mostly = 1;
static int banks __read_mostly;
static int rip_msr __read_mostly;
static int mce_bootlog __read_mostly = -1;
static int monarch_timeout __read_mostly = -1;
static int mce_panic_timeout __read_mostly;
static int mce_dont_log_ce __read_mostly;
int mce_cmci_disabled __read_mostly;
int mce_ignore_ce __read_mostly;
int mce_ser __read_mostly;
struct mce_bank *mce_banks __read_mostly;
/* User mode helper program triggered by machine check event */
static unsigned long mce_need_notify;
static char mce_helper[128];
static char *mce_helper_argv[2] = { mce_helper, NULL };
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(mce_wait);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mce, mces_seen);
static int cpu_missing;
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
static void default_decode_mce(struct mce *m)
{
pr_emerg("No human readable MCE decoding support on this CPU type.\n");
pr_emerg("Run the message through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode.\n");
}
/*
* CPU/chipset specific EDAC code can register a callback here to print
* MCE errors in a human-readable form:
*/
void (*x86_mce_decode_callback)(struct mce *m) = default_decode_mce;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(x86_mce_decode_callback);
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
/* MCA banks polled by the period polling timer for corrected events */
DEFINE_PER_CPU(mce_banks_t, mce_poll_banks) = {
[0 ... BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NR_BANKS)-1] = ~0UL
};
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct work_struct, mce_work);
/* Do initial initialization of a struct mce */
void mce_setup(struct mce *m)
{
memset(m, 0, sizeof(struct mce));
m->cpu = m->extcpu = smp_processor_id();
rdtscll(m->tsc);
x86, mce: extend struct mce user interface with more information. Experience has shown that struct mce which is used to pass an machine check to the user space daemon currently a few limitations. Also some data which is useful to print at panic level is also missing. This patch addresses most of them. The same information is also printed out together with mce panic. struct mce can be painlessly extended in a compatible way, the mcelog user space code just ignores additional fields with a warning. - It doesn't provide a wall time timestamp. There have been a few complaints about that. Fix that by adding a 64bit time_t - It doesn't provide the exact CPU identification. This makes it awkward for mcelog to decode the event correctly, especially when there are variations in the supported MCE codes on different CPU models or when mcelog is running on a different host after a panic. Previously the administrator had to specify the correct CPU when mcelog ran on a different host, but with the more variation in machine checks now it's better to auto detect that. It's also useful for more detailed analysis of CPU events. Pass CPUID 1.EAX and the cpu vendor (as encoded in processor.h) instead. - Socket ID and initial APIC ID are useful to report because they allow to identify the failing CPU in some (not all) cases. This is also especially useful for the panic situation. This addresses one of the complaints from Thomas Gleixner earlier. - The MCG capabilities MSR needs to be reported for some advanced error processing in mcelog Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:56 +00:00
/* We hope get_seconds stays lockless */
m->time = get_seconds();
m->cpuvendor = boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor;
m->cpuid = cpuid_eax(1);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
m->socketid = cpu_data(m->extcpu).phys_proc_id;
#endif
m->apicid = cpu_data(m->extcpu).initial_apicid;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, m->mcgcap);
}
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mce, injectm);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(injectm);
/*
* Lockless MCE logging infrastructure.
* This avoids deadlocks on printk locks without having to break locks. Also
* separate MCEs from kernel messages to avoid bogus bug reports.
*/
static struct mce_log mcelog = {
.signature = MCE_LOG_SIGNATURE,
.len = MCE_LOG_LEN,
.recordlen = sizeof(struct mce),
};
void mce_log(struct mce *mce)
{
unsigned next, entry;
mce->finished = 0;
wmb();
for (;;) {
entry = rcu_dereference(mcelog.next);
for (;;) {
/*
* When the buffer fills up discard new entries.
* Assume that the earlier errors are the more
* interesting ones:
*/
if (entry >= MCE_LOG_LEN) {
set_bit(MCE_OVERFLOW,
(unsigned long *)&mcelog.flags);
return;
}
/* Old left over entry. Skip: */
if (mcelog.entry[entry].finished) {
entry++;
continue;
}
break;
}
smp_rmb();
next = entry + 1;
if (cmpxchg(&mcelog.next, entry, next) == entry)
break;
}
memcpy(mcelog.entry + entry, mce, sizeof(struct mce));
wmb();
mcelog.entry[entry].finished = 1;
wmb();
mce->finished = 1;
set_bit(0, &mce_need_notify);
}
static void print_mce(struct mce *m)
{
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_emerg("CPU %d: Machine Check Exception: %16Lx Bank %d: %016Lx\n",
m->extcpu, m->mcgstatus, m->bank, m->status);
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
if (m->ip) {
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_emerg("RIP%s %02x:<%016Lx> ",
!(m->mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_EIPV) ? " !INEXACT!" : "",
m->cs, m->ip);
if (m->cs == __KERNEL_CS)
print_symbol("{%s}", m->ip);
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_cont("\n");
}
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_emerg("TSC %llx ", m->tsc);
if (m->addr)
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_cont("ADDR %llx ", m->addr);
if (m->misc)
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_cont("MISC %llx ", m->misc);
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_cont("\n");
pr_emerg("PROCESSOR %u:%x TIME %llu SOCKET %u APIC %x\n",
m->cpuvendor, m->cpuid, m->time, m->socketid, m->apicid);
/*
* Print out human-readable details about the MCE error,
* (if the CPU has an implementation for that):
*/
x86_mce_decode_callback(m);
}
static void print_mce_head(void)
{
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_emerg("\nHARDWARE ERROR\n");
}
static void print_mce_tail(void)
{
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
pr_emerg("This is not a software problem!\n");
}
#define PANIC_TIMEOUT 5 /* 5 seconds */
static atomic_t mce_paniced;
static int fake_panic;
static atomic_t mce_fake_paniced;
/* Panic in progress. Enable interrupts and wait for final IPI */
static void wait_for_panic(void)
{
long timeout = PANIC_TIMEOUT*USEC_PER_SEC;
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
preempt_disable();
local_irq_enable();
while (timeout-- > 0)
udelay(1);
if (panic_timeout == 0)
panic_timeout = mce_panic_timeout;
panic("Panicing machine check CPU died");
}
static void mce_panic(char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
{
int i;
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
if (!fake_panic) {
/*
* Make sure only one CPU runs in machine check panic
*/
if (atomic_inc_return(&mce_paniced) > 1)
wait_for_panic();
barrier();
bust_spinlocks(1);
console_verbose();
} else {
/* Don't log too much for fake panic */
if (atomic_inc_return(&mce_fake_paniced) > 1)
return;
}
print_mce_head();
/* First print corrected ones that are still unlogged */
for (i = 0; i < MCE_LOG_LEN; i++) {
struct mce *m = &mcelog.entry[i];
if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
continue;
if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC))
print_mce(m);
}
/* Now print uncorrected but with the final one last */
for (i = 0; i < MCE_LOG_LEN; i++) {
struct mce *m = &mcelog.entry[i];
if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
continue;
if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC))
continue;
if (!final || memcmp(m, final, sizeof(struct mce)))
print_mce(m);
}
if (final)
print_mce(final);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
if (cpu_missing)
printk(KERN_EMERG "Some CPUs didn't answer in synchronization\n");
print_mce_tail();
if (exp)
printk(KERN_EMERG "Machine check: %s\n", exp);
if (!fake_panic) {
if (panic_timeout == 0)
panic_timeout = mce_panic_timeout;
panic(msg);
} else
printk(KERN_EMERG "Fake kernel panic: %s\n", msg);
}
/* Support code for software error injection */
static int msr_to_offset(u32 msr)
{
unsigned bank = __get_cpu_var(injectm.bank);
x86: EDAC: MCE: Fix MCE decoding callback logic Make decoding of MCEs happen only on AMD hardware by registering a non-default callback only on CPU families which support it. While looking at the interaction of decode_mce() with the other MCE code i also noticed a few other things and made the following cleanups/fixes: - Fixed the mce_decode() weak alias - a weak alias is really not good here, it should be a proper callback. A weak alias will be overriden if a piece of code is built into the kernel - not good, obviously. - The patch initializes the callback on AMD family 10h and 11h. - Added the more correct fallback printk of: No support for human readable MCE decoding on this CPU type. Transcribe the message and run it through 'mcelog --ascii' to decode. On CPUs that dont have a decoder. - Made the surrounding code more readable. Note that the callback allows us to have a default fallback - without having to check the CPU versions during the printout itself. When an EDAC module registers itself, it can install the decode-print function. (there's no unregister needed as this is core code.) version -v2 by Borislav Petkov: - add K8 to the set of supported CPUs - always build in edac_mce_amd since we use an early_initcall now - fix checkpatch warnings Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> LKML-Reference: <20091001141432.GA11410@aftab> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-10-01 14:14:32 +00:00
if (msr == rip_msr)
return offsetof(struct mce, ip);
if (msr == MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(bank))
return offsetof(struct mce, status);
if (msr == MSR_IA32_MCx_ADDR(bank))
return offsetof(struct mce, addr);
if (msr == MSR_IA32_MCx_MISC(bank))
return offsetof(struct mce, misc);
if (msr == MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS)
return offsetof(struct mce, mcgstatus);
return -1;
}
/* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
{
u64 v;
if (__get_cpu_var(injectm).finished) {
int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
if (offset < 0)
return 0;
return *(u64 *)((char *)&__get_cpu_var(injectm) + offset);
}
if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &v)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "mce: Unable to read msr %d!\n", msr);
/*
* Return zero in case the access faulted. This should
* not happen normally but can happen if the CPU does
* something weird, or if the code is buggy.
*/
v = 0;
}
return v;
}
static void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
{
if (__get_cpu_var(injectm).finished) {
int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
if (offset >= 0)
*(u64 *)((char *)&__get_cpu_var(injectm) + offset) = v;
return;
}
wrmsrl(msr, v);
}
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
/*
* Simple lockless ring to communicate PFNs from the exception handler with the
* process context work function. This is vastly simplified because there's
* only a single reader and a single writer.
*/
#define MCE_RING_SIZE 16 /* we use one entry less */
struct mce_ring {
unsigned short start;
unsigned short end;
unsigned long ring[MCE_RING_SIZE];
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mce_ring, mce_ring);
/* Runs with CPU affinity in workqueue */
static int mce_ring_empty(void)
{
struct mce_ring *r = &__get_cpu_var(mce_ring);
return r->start == r->end;
}
static int mce_ring_get(unsigned long *pfn)
{
struct mce_ring *r;
int ret = 0;
*pfn = 0;
get_cpu();
r = &__get_cpu_var(mce_ring);
if (r->start == r->end)
goto out;
*pfn = r->ring[r->start];
r->start = (r->start + 1) % MCE_RING_SIZE;
ret = 1;
out:
put_cpu();
return ret;
}
/* Always runs in MCE context with preempt off */
static int mce_ring_add(unsigned long pfn)
{
struct mce_ring *r = &__get_cpu_var(mce_ring);
unsigned next;
next = (r->end + 1) % MCE_RING_SIZE;
if (next == r->start)
return -1;
r->ring[r->end] = pfn;
wmb();
r->end = next;
return 0;
}
x86, mce, cmci: add CMCI support Impact: Major new feature Intel CMCI (Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) is a new feature on Nehalem CPUs. It allows the CPU to trigger interrupts on corrected events, which allows faster reaction to them instead of with the traditional polling timer. Also use CMCI to discover shared banks. Machine check banks can be shared by CPU threads or even cores. Using the CMCI enable bit it is possible to detect the fact that another CPU already saw a specific bank. Use this to assign shared banks only to one CPU to avoid reporting duplicated events. On CPU hot unplug bank sharing is re discovered. This is done using a thread that cycles through all the CPUs. To avoid races between the poller and CMCI we only poll for banks that are not CMCI capable and only check CMCI owned banks on a interrupt. The shared banks ownership information is currently only used for CMCI interrupts, not polled banks. The sharing discovery code follows the algorithm recommended in the IA32 SDM Vol3a 14.5.2.1 The CMCI interrupt handler just calls the machine check poller to pick up the machine check event that caused the interrupt. I decided not to implement a separate threshold event like the AMD version has, because the threshold is always one currently and adding another event didn't seem to add any value. Some code inspired by Yunhong Jiang's Xen implementation, which was in term inspired by a earlier CMCI implementation by me. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:49:36 +00:00
int mce_available(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
if (mce_disabled)
return 0;
return cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MCE) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MCA);
}
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
static void mce_schedule_work(void)
{
if (!mce_ring_empty()) {
struct work_struct *work = &__get_cpu_var(mce_work);
if (!work_pending(work))
schedule_work(work);
}
}
/*
* Get the address of the instruction at the time of the machine check
* error.
*/
static inline void mce_get_rip(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (regs && (m->mcgstatus & (MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV))) {
m->ip = regs->ip;
m->cs = regs->cs;
} else {
m->ip = 0;
m->cs = 0;
}
if (rip_msr)
m->ip = mce_rdmsrl(rip_msr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
/*
* Called after interrupts have been reenabled again
* when a MCE happened during an interrupts off region
* in the kernel.
*/
asmlinkage void smp_mce_self_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
ack_APIC_irq();
exit_idle();
irq_enter();
mce_notify_irq();
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
mce_schedule_work();
irq_exit();
}
#endif
static void mce_report_event(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (regs->flags & (X86_VM_MASK|X86_EFLAGS_IF)) {
mce_notify_irq();
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
/*
* Triggering the work queue here is just an insurance
* policy in case the syscall exit notify handler
* doesn't run soon enough or ends up running on the
* wrong CPU (can happen when audit sleeps)
*/
mce_schedule_work();
return;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
/*
* Without APIC do not notify. The event will be picked
* up eventually.
*/
if (!cpu_has_apic)
return;
/*
* When interrupts are disabled we cannot use
* kernel services safely. Trigger an self interrupt
* through the APIC to instead do the notification
* after interrupts are reenabled again.
*/
apic->send_IPI_self(MCE_SELF_VECTOR);
/*
* Wait for idle afterwards again so that we don't leave the
* APIC in a non idle state because the normal APIC writes
* cannot exclude us.
*/
apic_wait_icr_idle();
#endif
}
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned, mce_poll_count);
/*
* Poll for corrected events or events that happened before reset.
* Those are just logged through /dev/mcelog.
*
* This is executed in standard interrupt context.
*
* Note: spec recommends to panic for fatal unsignalled
* errors here. However this would be quite problematic --
* we would need to reimplement the Monarch handling and
* it would mess up the exclusion between exception handler
* and poll hander -- * so we skip this for now.
* These cases should not happen anyways, or only when the CPU
* is already totally * confused. In this case it's likely it will
* not fully execute the machine check handler either.
*/
void machine_check_poll(enum mcp_flags flags, mce_banks_t *b)
{
struct mce m;
int i;
__get_cpu_var(mce_poll_count)++;
mce_setup(&m);
m.mcgstatus = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS);
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
if (!mce_banks[i].ctl || !test_bit(i, *b))
continue;
m.misc = 0;
m.addr = 0;
m.bank = i;
m.tsc = 0;
barrier();
m.status = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i));
if (!(m.status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
continue;
/*
* Uncorrected or signalled events are handled by the exception
* handler when it is enabled, so don't process those here.
*
* TBD do the same check for MCI_STATUS_EN here?
*/
if (!(flags & MCP_UC) &&
(m.status & (mce_ser ? MCI_STATUS_S : MCI_STATUS_UC)))
continue;
if (m.status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV)
m.misc = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_MISC(i));
if (m.status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV)
m.addr = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_ADDR(i));
if (!(flags & MCP_TIMESTAMP))
m.tsc = 0;
/*
* Don't get the IP here because it's unlikely to
* have anything to do with the actual error location.
*/
if (!(flags & MCP_DONTLOG) && !mce_dont_log_ce) {
mce_log(&m);
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
}
/*
* Clear state for this bank.
*/
mce_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i), 0);
}
/*
* Don't clear MCG_STATUS here because it's only defined for
* exceptions.
*/
sync_core();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(machine_check_poll);
/*
* Do a quick check if any of the events requires a panic.
* This decides if we keep the events around or clear them.
*/
static int mce_no_way_out(struct mce *m, char **msg)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
m->status = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i));
if (mce_severity(m, tolerant, msg) >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
/*
* Variable to establish order between CPUs while scanning.
* Each CPU spins initially until executing is equal its number.
*/
static atomic_t mce_executing;
/*
* Defines order of CPUs on entry. First CPU becomes Monarch.
*/
static atomic_t mce_callin;
/*
* Check if a timeout waiting for other CPUs happened.
*/
static int mce_timed_out(u64 *t)
{
/*
* The others already did panic for some reason.
* Bail out like in a timeout.
* rmb() to tell the compiler that system_state
* might have been modified by someone else.
*/
rmb();
if (atomic_read(&mce_paniced))
wait_for_panic();
if (!monarch_timeout)
goto out;
if ((s64)*t < SPINUNIT) {
/* CHECKME: Make panic default for 1 too? */
if (tolerant < 1)
mce_panic("Timeout synchronizing machine check over CPUs",
NULL, NULL);
cpu_missing = 1;
return 1;
}
*t -= SPINUNIT;
out:
touch_nmi_watchdog();
return 0;
}
/*
* The Monarch's reign. The Monarch is the CPU who entered
* the machine check handler first. It waits for the others to
* raise the exception too and then grades them. When any
* error is fatal panic. Only then let the others continue.
*
* The other CPUs entering the MCE handler will be controlled by the
* Monarch. They are called Subjects.
*
* This way we prevent any potential data corruption in a unrecoverable case
* and also makes sure always all CPU's errors are examined.
*
* Also this detects the case of a machine check event coming from outer
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
* space (not detected by any CPUs) In this case some external agent wants
* us to shut down, so panic too.
*
* The other CPUs might still decide to panic if the handler happens
* in a unrecoverable place, but in this case the system is in a semi-stable
* state and won't corrupt anything by itself. It's ok to let the others
* continue for a bit first.
*
* All the spin loops have timeouts; when a timeout happens a CPU
* typically elects itself to be Monarch.
*/
static void mce_reign(void)
{
int cpu;
struct mce *m = NULL;
int global_worst = 0;
char *msg = NULL;
char *nmsg = NULL;
/*
* This CPU is the Monarch and the other CPUs have run
* through their handlers.
* Grade the severity of the errors of all the CPUs.
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
int severity = mce_severity(&per_cpu(mces_seen, cpu), tolerant,
&nmsg);
if (severity > global_worst) {
msg = nmsg;
global_worst = severity;
m = &per_cpu(mces_seen, cpu);
}
}
/*
* Cannot recover? Panic here then.
* This dumps all the mces in the log buffer and stops the
* other CPUs.
*/
if (m && global_worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY && tolerant < 3)
mce_panic("Fatal Machine check", m, msg);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
/*
* For UC somewhere we let the CPU who detects it handle it.
* Also must let continue the others, otherwise the handling
* CPU could deadlock on a lock.
*/
/*
* No machine check event found. Must be some external
* source or one CPU is hung. Panic.
*/
if (global_worst <= MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY && tolerant < 3)
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
mce_panic("Machine check from unknown source", NULL, NULL);
/*
* Now clear all the mces_seen so that they don't reappear on
* the next mce.
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
memset(&per_cpu(mces_seen, cpu), 0, sizeof(struct mce));
}
static atomic_t global_nwo;
/*
* Start of Monarch synchronization. This waits until all CPUs have
* entered the exception handler and then determines if any of them
* saw a fatal event that requires panic. Then it executes them
* in the entry order.
* TBD double check parallel CPU hotunplug
*/
static int mce_start(int *no_way_out)
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
{
int order;
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
int cpus = num_online_cpus();
u64 timeout = (u64)monarch_timeout * NSEC_PER_USEC;
if (!timeout)
return -1;
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
atomic_add(*no_way_out, &global_nwo);
/*
* global_nwo should be updated before mce_callin
*/
smp_wmb();
order = atomic_inc_return(&mce_callin);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
/*
* Wait for everyone.
*/
while (atomic_read(&mce_callin) != cpus) {
if (mce_timed_out(&timeout)) {
atomic_set(&global_nwo, 0);
return -1;
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
}
ndelay(SPINUNIT);
}
/*
* mce_callin should be read before global_nwo
*/
smp_rmb();
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
if (order == 1) {
/*
* Monarch: Starts executing now, the others wait.
*/
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
atomic_set(&mce_executing, 1);
} else {
/*
* Subject: Now start the scanning loop one by one in
* the original callin order.
* This way when there are any shared banks it will be
* only seen by one CPU before cleared, avoiding duplicates.
*/
while (atomic_read(&mce_executing) < order) {
if (mce_timed_out(&timeout)) {
atomic_set(&global_nwo, 0);
return -1;
}
ndelay(SPINUNIT);
}
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
}
/*
* Cache the global no_way_out state.
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
*/
*no_way_out = atomic_read(&global_nwo);
return order;
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
}
/*
* Synchronize between CPUs after main scanning loop.
* This invokes the bulk of the Monarch processing.
*/
static int mce_end(int order)
{
int ret = -1;
u64 timeout = (u64)monarch_timeout * NSEC_PER_USEC;
if (!timeout)
goto reset;
if (order < 0)
goto reset;
/*
* Allow others to run.
*/
atomic_inc(&mce_executing);
if (order == 1) {
/* CHECKME: Can this race with a parallel hotplug? */
int cpus = num_online_cpus();
/*
* Monarch: Wait for everyone to go through their scanning
* loops.
*/
while (atomic_read(&mce_executing) <= cpus) {
if (mce_timed_out(&timeout))
goto reset;
ndelay(SPINUNIT);
}
mce_reign();
barrier();
ret = 0;
} else {
/*
* Subject: Wait for Monarch to finish.
*/
while (atomic_read(&mce_executing) != 0) {
if (mce_timed_out(&timeout))
goto reset;
ndelay(SPINUNIT);
}
/*
* Don't reset anything. That's done by the Monarch.
*/
return 0;
}
/*
* Reset all global state.
*/
reset:
atomic_set(&global_nwo, 0);
atomic_set(&mce_callin, 0);
barrier();
/*
* Let others run again.
*/
atomic_set(&mce_executing, 0);
return ret;
}
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
/*
* Check if the address reported by the CPU is in a format we can parse.
* It would be possible to add code for most other cases, but all would
* be somewhat complicated (e.g. segment offset would require an instruction
* parser). So only support physical addresses upto page granuality for now.
*/
static int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m)
{
if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV) || !(m->status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV))
return 0;
if ((m->misc & 0x3f) > PAGE_SHIFT)
return 0;
if (((m->misc >> 6) & 7) != MCM_ADDR_PHYS)
return 0;
return 1;
}
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
static void mce_clear_state(unsigned long *toclear)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
if (test_bit(i, toclear))
mce_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i), 0);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
}
}
/*
* The actual machine check handler. This only handles real
* exceptions when something got corrupted coming in through int 18.
*
* This is executed in NMI context not subject to normal locking rules. This
* implies that most kernel services cannot be safely used. Don't even
* think about putting a printk in there!
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
*
* On Intel systems this is entered on all CPUs in parallel through
* MCE broadcast. However some CPUs might be broken beyond repair,
* so be always careful when synchronizing with others.
*/
void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
struct mce m, *final;
int i;
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
int worst = 0;
int severity;
/*
* Establish sequential order between the CPUs entering the machine
* check handler.
*/
int order;
x86_64: mcelog tolerant level cleanup Background: The MCE handler has several paths that it can take, depending on various conditions of the MCE status and the value of the 'tolerant' knob. The exact semantics are not well defined and the code is a bit twisty. Description: This patch makes the MCE handler's behavior more clear by documenting the behavior for various 'tolerant' levels. It also fixes or enhances several small things in the handler. Specifically: * If RIPV is set it is not safe to restart, so set the 'no way out' flag rather than the 'kill it' flag. * Don't panic() on correctable MCEs. * If the _OVER bit is set *and* the _UC bit is set (meaning possibly dropped uncorrected errors), set the 'no way out' flag. * Use EIPV for testing whether an app can be killed (SIGBUS) rather than RIPV. According to docs, EIPV indicates that the error is related to the IP, while RIPV simply means the IP is valid to restart from. * Don't clear the MCi_STATUS registers until after the panic() path. This leaves the status bits set after the panic() so clever BIOSes can find them (and dumb BIOSes can do nothing). This patch also calls nonseekable_open() in mce_open (as suggested by akpm). Result: Tolerant levels behave almost identically to how they always have, but not it's well defined. There's a slightly higher chance of panic()ing when multiple errors happen (a good thing, IMHO). If you take an MBE and panic(), the error status bits are not cleared. Alternatives: None. Testing: I used software to inject correctable and uncorrectable errors. With tolerant = 3, the system usually survives. With tolerant = 2, the system usually panic()s (PCC) but not always. With tolerant = 1, the system always panic()s. When the system panic()s, the BIOS is able to detect that the cause of death was an MC4. I was not able to reproduce the case of a non-PCC error in userspace, with EIPV, with (tolerant < 3). That will be rare at best. Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:37 +00:00
/*
* If no_way_out gets set, there is no safe way to recover from this
* MCE. If tolerant is cranked up, we'll try anyway.
*/
int no_way_out = 0;
/*
* If kill_it gets set, there might be a way to recover from this
* error.
*/
int kill_it = 0;
DECLARE_BITMAP(toclear, MAX_NR_BANKS);
char *msg = "Unknown";
atomic_inc(&mce_entry);
__get_cpu_var(mce_exception_count)++;
if (notify_die(DIE_NMI, "machine check", regs, error_code,
18, SIGKILL) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto out;
if (!banks)
goto out;
mce_setup(&m);
m.mcgstatus = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
final = &__get_cpu_var(mces_seen);
*final = m;
no_way_out = mce_no_way_out(&m, &msg);
barrier();
/*
* When no restart IP must always kill or panic.
*/
if (!(m.mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_RIPV))
kill_it = 1;
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
/*
* Go through all the banks in exclusion of the other CPUs.
* This way we don't report duplicated events on shared banks
* because the first one to see it will clear it.
*/
order = mce_start(&no_way_out);
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
__clear_bit(i, toclear);
if (!mce_banks[i].ctl)
continue;
m.misc = 0;
m.addr = 0;
m.bank = i;
m.status = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i));
if ((m.status & MCI_STATUS_VAL) == 0)
continue;
/*
* Non uncorrected or non signaled errors are handled by
* machine_check_poll. Leave them alone, unless this panics.
*/
if (!(m.status & (mce_ser ? MCI_STATUS_S : MCI_STATUS_UC)) &&
!no_way_out)
continue;
/*
* Set taint even when machine check was not enabled.
*/
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
severity = mce_severity(&m, tolerant, NULL);
/*
* When machine check was for corrected handler don't touch,
* unless we're panicing.
*/
if (severity == MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY && !no_way_out)
continue;
__set_bit(i, toclear);
if (severity == MCE_NO_SEVERITY) {
/*
* Machine check event was not enabled. Clear, but
* ignore.
*/
continue;
}
/*
* Kill on action required.
*/
if (severity == MCE_AR_SEVERITY)
kill_it = 1;
if (m.status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV)
m.misc = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_MISC(i));
if (m.status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV)
m.addr = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_ADDR(i));
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
/*
* Action optional error. Queue address for later processing.
* When the ring overflows we just ignore the AO error.
* RED-PEN add some logging mechanism when
* usable_address or mce_add_ring fails.
* RED-PEN don't ignore overflow for tolerant == 0
*/
if (severity == MCE_AO_SEVERITY && mce_usable_address(&m))
mce_ring_add(m.addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
mce_get_rip(&m, regs);
mce_log(&m);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
if (severity > worst) {
*final = m;
worst = severity;
}
}
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
if (!no_way_out)
mce_clear_state(toclear);
/*
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
* Do most of the synchronization with other CPUs.
* When there's any problem use only local no_way_out state.
*/
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
if (mce_end(order) < 0)
no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
x86_64: mcelog tolerant level cleanup Background: The MCE handler has several paths that it can take, depending on various conditions of the MCE status and the value of the 'tolerant' knob. The exact semantics are not well defined and the code is a bit twisty. Description: This patch makes the MCE handler's behavior more clear by documenting the behavior for various 'tolerant' levels. It also fixes or enhances several small things in the handler. Specifically: * If RIPV is set it is not safe to restart, so set the 'no way out' flag rather than the 'kill it' flag. * Don't panic() on correctable MCEs. * If the _OVER bit is set *and* the _UC bit is set (meaning possibly dropped uncorrected errors), set the 'no way out' flag. * Use EIPV for testing whether an app can be killed (SIGBUS) rather than RIPV. According to docs, EIPV indicates that the error is related to the IP, while RIPV simply means the IP is valid to restart from. * Don't clear the MCi_STATUS registers until after the panic() path. This leaves the status bits set after the panic() so clever BIOSes can find them (and dumb BIOSes can do nothing). This patch also calls nonseekable_open() in mce_open (as suggested by akpm). Result: Tolerant levels behave almost identically to how they always have, but not it's well defined. There's a slightly higher chance of panic()ing when multiple errors happen (a good thing, IMHO). If you take an MBE and panic(), the error status bits are not cleared. Alternatives: None. Testing: I used software to inject correctable and uncorrectable errors. With tolerant = 3, the system usually survives. With tolerant = 2, the system usually panic()s (PCC) but not always. With tolerant = 1, the system always panic()s. When the system panic()s, the BIOS is able to detect that the cause of death was an MC4. I was not able to reproduce the case of a non-PCC error in userspace, with EIPV, with (tolerant < 3). That will be rare at best. Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:37 +00:00
/*
* If we have decided that we just CAN'T continue, and the user
* has not set tolerant to an insane level, give up and die.
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
*
* This is mainly used in the case when the system doesn't
* support MCE broadcasting or it has been disabled.
x86_64: mcelog tolerant level cleanup Background: The MCE handler has several paths that it can take, depending on various conditions of the MCE status and the value of the 'tolerant' knob. The exact semantics are not well defined and the code is a bit twisty. Description: This patch makes the MCE handler's behavior more clear by documenting the behavior for various 'tolerant' levels. It also fixes or enhances several small things in the handler. Specifically: * If RIPV is set it is not safe to restart, so set the 'no way out' flag rather than the 'kill it' flag. * Don't panic() on correctable MCEs. * If the _OVER bit is set *and* the _UC bit is set (meaning possibly dropped uncorrected errors), set the 'no way out' flag. * Use EIPV for testing whether an app can be killed (SIGBUS) rather than RIPV. According to docs, EIPV indicates that the error is related to the IP, while RIPV simply means the IP is valid to restart from. * Don't clear the MCi_STATUS registers until after the panic() path. This leaves the status bits set after the panic() so clever BIOSes can find them (and dumb BIOSes can do nothing). This patch also calls nonseekable_open() in mce_open (as suggested by akpm). Result: Tolerant levels behave almost identically to how they always have, but not it's well defined. There's a slightly higher chance of panic()ing when multiple errors happen (a good thing, IMHO). If you take an MBE and panic(), the error status bits are not cleared. Alternatives: None. Testing: I used software to inject correctable and uncorrectable errors. With tolerant = 3, the system usually survives. With tolerant = 2, the system usually panic()s (PCC) but not always. With tolerant = 1, the system always panic()s. When the system panic()s, the BIOS is able to detect that the cause of death was an MC4. I was not able to reproduce the case of a non-PCC error in userspace, with EIPV, with (tolerant < 3). That will be rare at best. Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:37 +00:00
*/
if (no_way_out && tolerant < 3)
mce_panic("Fatal machine check on current CPU", final, msg);
x86_64: mcelog tolerant level cleanup Background: The MCE handler has several paths that it can take, depending on various conditions of the MCE status and the value of the 'tolerant' knob. The exact semantics are not well defined and the code is a bit twisty. Description: This patch makes the MCE handler's behavior more clear by documenting the behavior for various 'tolerant' levels. It also fixes or enhances several small things in the handler. Specifically: * If RIPV is set it is not safe to restart, so set the 'no way out' flag rather than the 'kill it' flag. * Don't panic() on correctable MCEs. * If the _OVER bit is set *and* the _UC bit is set (meaning possibly dropped uncorrected errors), set the 'no way out' flag. * Use EIPV for testing whether an app can be killed (SIGBUS) rather than RIPV. According to docs, EIPV indicates that the error is related to the IP, while RIPV simply means the IP is valid to restart from. * Don't clear the MCi_STATUS registers until after the panic() path. This leaves the status bits set after the panic() so clever BIOSes can find them (and dumb BIOSes can do nothing). This patch also calls nonseekable_open() in mce_open (as suggested by akpm). Result: Tolerant levels behave almost identically to how they always have, but not it's well defined. There's a slightly higher chance of panic()ing when multiple errors happen (a good thing, IMHO). If you take an MBE and panic(), the error status bits are not cleared. Alternatives: None. Testing: I used software to inject correctable and uncorrectable errors. With tolerant = 3, the system usually survives. With tolerant = 2, the system usually panic()s (PCC) but not always. With tolerant = 1, the system always panic()s. When the system panic()s, the BIOS is able to detect that the cause of death was an MC4. I was not able to reproduce the case of a non-PCC error in userspace, with EIPV, with (tolerant < 3). That will be rare at best. Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:37 +00:00
/*
* If the error seems to be unrecoverable, something should be
* done. Try to kill as little as possible. If we can kill just
* one task, do that. If the user has set the tolerance very
* high, don't try to do anything at all.
*/
if (kill_it && tolerant < 3)
force_sig(SIGBUS, current);
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
/* notify userspace ASAP */
set_thread_flag(TIF_MCE_NOTIFY);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
if (worst > 0)
mce_report_event(regs);
mce_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, 0);
out:
atomic_dec(&mce_entry);
sync_core();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_machine_check);
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
/* dummy to break dependency. actual code is in mm/memory-failure.c */
void __attribute__((weak)) memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int vector)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "Action optional memory failure at %lx ignored\n", pfn);
}
/*
* Called after mce notification in process context. This code
* is allowed to sleep. Call the high level VM handler to process
* any corrupted pages.
* Assume that the work queue code only calls this one at a time
* per CPU.
* Note we don't disable preemption, so this code might run on the wrong
* CPU. In this case the event is picked up by the scheduled work queue.
* This is merely a fast path to expedite processing in some common
* cases.
*/
void mce_notify_process(void)
{
unsigned long pfn;
mce_notify_irq();
while (mce_ring_get(&pfn))
memory_failure(pfn, MCE_VECTOR);
}
static void mce_process_work(struct work_struct *dummy)
{
mce_notify_process();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_INTEL
/***
* mce_log_therm_throt_event - Logs the thermal throttling event to mcelog
* @cpu: The CPU on which the event occurred.
* @status: Event status information
*
* This function should be called by the thermal interrupt after the
* event has been processed and the decision was made to log the event
* further.
*
* The status parameter will be saved to the 'status' field of 'struct mce'
* and historically has been the register value of the
* MSR_IA32_THERMAL_STATUS (Intel) msr.
*/
void mce_log_therm_throt_event(__u64 status)
{
struct mce m;
mce_setup(&m);
m.bank = MCE_THERMAL_BANK;
m.status = status;
mce_log(&m);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_MCE_INTEL */
/*
[PATCH] x86-64: Dynamically adjust machine check interval Background: We've found that MCEs (specifically DRAM SBEs) tend to come in bunches, especially when we are trying really hard to stress the system out. The current MCE poller uses a static interval which does not care whether it has or has not found MCEs recently. Description: This patch makes the MCE poller adjust the polling interval dynamically. If we find an MCE, poll 2x faster (down to 10 ms). When we stop finding MCEs, poll 2x slower (up to check_interval seconds). The check_interval tunable becomes the max polling interval. The "Machine check events logged" printk() is rate limited to the check_interval, which should be identical behavior to the old functionality. Result: If you start to take a lot of correctable errors (not exceptions), you log them faster and more accurately (less chance of overflowing the MCA registers). If you don't take a lot of errors, you will see no change. Alternatives: I considered simply reducing the polling interval to 10 ms immediately and keeping it there as long as we continue to find errors. This felt a bit heavy handed, but does perform significantly better for the default check_interval of 5 minutes (we're using a few seconds when testing for DRAM errors). I could be convinced to go with this, if anyone felt it was not too aggressive. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that the polling interval accelerates. The printk() only happens once per check_interval seconds. Patch: This patch is against 2.6.21-rc7. Signed-Off-By: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
2007-05-02 17:27:19 +00:00
* Periodic polling timer for "silent" machine check errors. If the
* poller finds an MCE, poll 2x faster. When the poller finds no more
* errors, poll 2x slower (up to check_interval seconds).
*/
static int check_interval = 5 * 60; /* 5 minutes */
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, mce_next_interval); /* in jiffies */
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct timer_list, mce_timer);
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
static void mcheck_timer(unsigned long data)
{
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
struct timer_list *t = &per_cpu(mce_timer, data);
int *n;
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
WARN_ON(smp_processor_id() != data);
if (mce_available(&current_cpu_data)) {
machine_check_poll(MCP_TIMESTAMP,
&__get_cpu_var(mce_poll_banks));
}
/*
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
* Alert userspace if needed. If we logged an MCE, reduce the
* polling interval, otherwise increase the polling interval.
*/
n = &__get_cpu_var(mce_next_interval);
if (mce_notify_irq())
*n = max(*n/2, HZ/100);
else
*n = min(*n*2, (int)round_jiffies_relative(check_interval*HZ));
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
t->expires = jiffies + *n;
add_timer_on(t, smp_processor_id());
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
}
static void mce_do_trigger(struct work_struct *work)
{
call_usermodehelper(mce_helper, mce_helper_argv, NULL, UMH_NO_WAIT);
}
static DECLARE_WORK(mce_trigger_work, mce_do_trigger);
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
/*
* Notify the user(s) about new machine check events.
* Can be called from interrupt context, but not from machine check/NMI
* context.
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
*/
int mce_notify_irq(void)
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
{
/* Not more than two messages every minute */
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(ratelimit, 60*HZ, 2);
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
clear_thread_flag(TIF_MCE_NOTIFY);
if (test_and_clear_bit(0, &mce_need_notify)) {
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
wake_up_interruptible(&mce_wait);
/*
* There is no risk of missing notifications because
* work_pending is always cleared before the function is
* executed.
*/
if (mce_helper[0] && !work_pending(&mce_trigger_work))
schedule_work(&mce_trigger_work);
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
if (__ratelimit(&ratelimit))
[PATCH] x86-64: Dynamically adjust machine check interval Background: We've found that MCEs (specifically DRAM SBEs) tend to come in bunches, especially when we are trying really hard to stress the system out. The current MCE poller uses a static interval which does not care whether it has or has not found MCEs recently. Description: This patch makes the MCE poller adjust the polling interval dynamically. If we find an MCE, poll 2x faster (down to 10 ms). When we stop finding MCEs, poll 2x slower (up to check_interval seconds). The check_interval tunable becomes the max polling interval. The "Machine check events logged" printk() is rate limited to the check_interval, which should be identical behavior to the old functionality. Result: If you start to take a lot of correctable errors (not exceptions), you log them faster and more accurately (less chance of overflowing the MCA registers). If you don't take a lot of errors, you will see no change. Alternatives: I considered simply reducing the polling interval to 10 ms immediately and keeping it there as long as we continue to find errors. This felt a bit heavy handed, but does perform significantly better for the default check_interval of 5 minutes (we're using a few seconds when testing for DRAM errors). I could be convinced to go with this, if anyone felt it was not too aggressive. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that the polling interval accelerates. The printk() only happens once per check_interval seconds. Patch: This patch is against 2.6.21-rc7. Signed-Off-By: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
2007-05-02 17:27:19 +00:00
printk(KERN_INFO "Machine check events logged\n");
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
return 1;
}
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_notify_irq);
[PATCH] x86-64: Dynamically adjust machine check interval Background: We've found that MCEs (specifically DRAM SBEs) tend to come in bunches, especially when we are trying really hard to stress the system out. The current MCE poller uses a static interval which does not care whether it has or has not found MCEs recently. Description: This patch makes the MCE poller adjust the polling interval dynamically. If we find an MCE, poll 2x faster (down to 10 ms). When we stop finding MCEs, poll 2x slower (up to check_interval seconds). The check_interval tunable becomes the max polling interval. The "Machine check events logged" printk() is rate limited to the check_interval, which should be identical behavior to the old functionality. Result: If you start to take a lot of correctable errors (not exceptions), you log them faster and more accurately (less chance of overflowing the MCA registers). If you don't take a lot of errors, you will see no change. Alternatives: I considered simply reducing the polling interval to 10 ms immediately and keeping it there as long as we continue to find errors. This felt a bit heavy handed, but does perform significantly better for the default check_interval of 5 minutes (we're using a few seconds when testing for DRAM errors). I could be convinced to go with this, if anyone felt it was not too aggressive. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that the polling interval accelerates. The printk() only happens once per check_interval seconds. Patch: This patch is against 2.6.21-rc7. Signed-Off-By: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
2007-05-02 17:27:19 +00:00
static int mce_banks_init(void)
{
int i;
mce_banks = kzalloc(banks * sizeof(struct mce_bank), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mce_banks)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
b->ctl = -1ULL;
b->init = 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Initialize Machine Checks for a CPU.
*/
static int __cpuinit mce_cap_init(void)
{
unsigned b;
u64 cap;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, cap);
b = cap & MCG_BANKCNT_MASK;
printk(KERN_INFO "mce: CPU supports %d MCE banks\n", b);
if (b > MAX_NR_BANKS) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"MCE: Using only %u machine check banks out of %u\n",
MAX_NR_BANKS, b);
b = MAX_NR_BANKS;
}
/* Don't support asymmetric configurations today */
WARN_ON(banks != 0 && b != banks);
banks = b;
if (!mce_banks) {
int err = mce_banks_init();
if (err)
return err;
}
/* Use accurate RIP reporting if available. */
if ((cap & MCG_EXT_P) && MCG_EXT_CNT(cap) >= 9)
rip_msr = MSR_IA32_MCG_EIP;
if (cap & MCG_SER_P)
mce_ser = 1;
return 0;
}
static void mce_init(void)
{
mce_banks_t all_banks;
u64 cap;
int i;
/*
* Log the machine checks left over from the previous reset.
*/
bitmap_fill(all_banks, MAX_NR_BANKS);
machine_check_poll(MCP_UC|(!mce_bootlog ? MCP_DONTLOG : 0), &all_banks);
set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_MCE);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, cap);
if (cap & MCG_CTL_P)
wrmsr(MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff);
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
if (!b->init)
continue;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(i), b->ctl);
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i), 0);
}
}
/* Add per CPU specific workarounds here */
static int __cpuinit mce_cpu_quirks(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
x86, mce: Don't initialize MCEs on unknown CPUs An older test-box started hanging at the following point during bootup: [ 0.022996] Mount-cache hash table entries: 512 [ 0.024996] Initializing cgroup subsys debug [ 0.025996] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuacct [ 0.026995] Initializing cgroup subsys devices [ 0.027995] Initializing cgroup subsys freezer [ 0.028995] mce: CPU supports 5 MCE banks I've bisected it down to commit 4efc0670 ("x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit"), which utilizes the MCE code on 32-bit systems too. The problem is caused by this detail in my config: # CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL is not set This disables the quirks in mce_cpu_quirks() but still enables MCE support - which then hangs due to the missing quirk workaround needed on this CPU: if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 0x1A && banks > 0) mce_banks[0].init = 0; The safe solution is to not initialize MCEs if we dont know on what CPU we are running (or if that CPU's support code got disabled in the config). Also be a bit more defensive on 32-bit systems: dont do a boot-time dump of pending MCEs not just on the specific system that we found a problem with (Pentium-M), but earlier ones as well. Now this problem is probably not common and disabling CPU support is rare - but still being more defensive in something we turned on for a wide range of CPUs is prudent. Cc: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> LKML-Reference: Message-ID: <4A88E3E4.40506@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-17 08:19:00 +00:00
if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN) {
pr_info("MCE: unknown CPU type - not enabling MCE support.\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* This should be disabled by the BIOS, but isn't always */
if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
if (c->x86 == 15 && banks > 4) {
/*
* disable GART TBL walk error reporting, which
* trips off incorrectly with the IOMMU & 3ware
* & Cerberus:
*/
clear_bit(10, (unsigned long *)&mce_banks[4].ctl);
}
if (c->x86 <= 17 && mce_bootlog < 0) {
/*
* Lots of broken BIOS around that don't clear them
* by default and leave crap in there. Don't log:
*/
mce_bootlog = 0;
}
/*
* Various K7s with broken bank 0 around. Always disable
* by default.
*/
x86: mce: Handle banks == 0 case in K7 quirk Vegard Nossum reported: > I get an MCE-related crash like this in latest linus tree: > > [ 0.115341] CPU: L1 I Cache: 64K (64 bytes/line), D cache 64K (64 bytes/line) > [ 0.116396] CPU: L2 Cache: 512K (64 bytes/line) > [ 0.120570] mce: CPU supports 0 MCE banks > [ 0.124870] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000 00000010 > [ 0.128001] IP: [<ffffffff813b98ad>] mcheck_init+0x278/0x320 > [ 0.128001] PGD 0 > [ 0.128001] Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted > [ 0.128001] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP > [ 0.128001] last sysfs file: > [ 0.128001] CPU 0 > [ 0.128001] Modules linked in: > [ 0.128001] Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.30 #426 > [ 0.128001] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff813b98ad>] [<ffffffff813b98ad>] mcheck_init+0x278/0x320 > [ 0.128001] RSP: 0018:ffffffff81595e38 EFLAGS: 00000246 > [ 0.128001] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: ffffffff8158f900 RCX: 0000000000000000 > [ 0.128001] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000ff RDI: 0000000000000010 > [ 0.128001] RBP: ffffffff81595e68 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 > [ 0.128001] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 > [ 0.128001] R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 > [ 0.128001] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880002288000(0000) knlGS:00000 > 00000000000 > [ 0.128001] CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b > [ 0.128001] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000001001000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 > [ 0.128001] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > [ 0.128001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 0000000000000000 DR7: 0000000000000000 > [ 0.128001] Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81594000, task ffffff > ff8152a4a0) > [ 0.128001] Stack: > [ 0.128001] 0000000081595e68 5aa50ed3b4ddbe6e ffffffff8158f900 ffffffff8158f > 914 > [ 0.128001] ffffffff8158f948 0000000000000000 ffffffff81595eb8 ffffffff813b8 > 69c > [ 0.128001] 5aa50ed3b4ddbe6e 00000001078bfbfd 0000062300000800 5aa50ed3b4ddb > e6e > [ 0.128001] Call Trace: > [ 0.128001] [<ffffffff813b869c>] identify_cpu+0x331/0x392 > [ 0.128001] [<ffffffff815a1445>] identify_boot_cpu+0x23/0x6e > [ 0.128001] [<ffffffff815a14ac>] check_bugs+0x1c/0x60 > [ 0.128001] [<ffffffff8159c075>] start_kernel+0x403/0x46e > [ 0.128001] [<ffffffff8159b2ac>] x86_64_start_reservations+0xac/0xd5 > [ 0.128001] [<ffffffff8159b3ea>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x115/0x14b > [ 0.128001] [<ffffffff8159b140>] ? early_idt_handler+0x0/0x71 This happens on QEMU which reports MCA capability, but no banks. Without this patch there is a buffer overrun and boot ops because the code would try to initialize the 0 element of a zero length kmalloc() buffer. Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> Tested-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> LKML-Reference: <20090615125200.GD31969@one.firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-06-15 12:52:01 +00:00
if (c->x86 == 6 && banks > 0)
mce_banks[0].ctl = 0;
}
if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
/*
* SDM documents that on family 6 bank 0 should not be written
* because it aliases to another special BIOS controlled
* register.
* But it's not aliased anymore on model 0x1a+
* Don't ignore bank 0 completely because there could be a
* valid event later, merely don't write CTL0.
*/
if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 0x1A && banks > 0)
mce_banks[0].init = 0;
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
/*
* All newer Intel systems support MCE broadcasting. Enable
* synchronization with a one second timeout.
*/
if ((c->x86 > 6 || (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model >= 0xe)) &&
monarch_timeout < 0)
monarch_timeout = USEC_PER_SEC;
x86, mce: Don't initialize MCEs on unknown CPUs An older test-box started hanging at the following point during bootup: [ 0.022996] Mount-cache hash table entries: 512 [ 0.024996] Initializing cgroup subsys debug [ 0.025996] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuacct [ 0.026995] Initializing cgroup subsys devices [ 0.027995] Initializing cgroup subsys freezer [ 0.028995] mce: CPU supports 5 MCE banks I've bisected it down to commit 4efc0670 ("x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit"), which utilizes the MCE code on 32-bit systems too. The problem is caused by this detail in my config: # CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL is not set This disables the quirks in mce_cpu_quirks() but still enables MCE support - which then hangs due to the missing quirk workaround needed on this CPU: if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 0x1A && banks > 0) mce_banks[0].init = 0; The safe solution is to not initialize MCEs if we dont know on what CPU we are running (or if that CPU's support code got disabled in the config). Also be a bit more defensive on 32-bit systems: dont do a boot-time dump of pending MCEs not just on the specific system that we found a problem with (Pentium-M), but earlier ones as well. Now this problem is probably not common and disabling CPU support is rare - but still being more defensive in something we turned on for a wide range of CPUs is prudent. Cc: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> LKML-Reference: Message-ID: <4A88E3E4.40506@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-17 08:19:00 +00:00
/*
* There are also broken BIOSes on some Pentium M and
* earlier systems:
*/
if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model <= 13 && mce_bootlog < 0)
mce_bootlog = 0;
}
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
if (monarch_timeout < 0)
monarch_timeout = 0;
if (mce_bootlog != 0)
mce_panic_timeout = 30;
x86, mce: Don't initialize MCEs on unknown CPUs An older test-box started hanging at the following point during bootup: [ 0.022996] Mount-cache hash table entries: 512 [ 0.024996] Initializing cgroup subsys debug [ 0.025996] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuacct [ 0.026995] Initializing cgroup subsys devices [ 0.027995] Initializing cgroup subsys freezer [ 0.028995] mce: CPU supports 5 MCE banks I've bisected it down to commit 4efc0670 ("x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit"), which utilizes the MCE code on 32-bit systems too. The problem is caused by this detail in my config: # CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL is not set This disables the quirks in mce_cpu_quirks() but still enables MCE support - which then hangs due to the missing quirk workaround needed on this CPU: if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 0x1A && banks > 0) mce_banks[0].init = 0; The safe solution is to not initialize MCEs if we dont know on what CPU we are running (or if that CPU's support code got disabled in the config). Also be a bit more defensive on 32-bit systems: dont do a boot-time dump of pending MCEs not just on the specific system that we found a problem with (Pentium-M), but earlier ones as well. Now this problem is probably not common and disabling CPU support is rare - but still being more defensive in something we turned on for a wide range of CPUs is prudent. Cc: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> LKML-Reference: Message-ID: <4A88E3E4.40506@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-17 08:19:00 +00:00
return 0;
}
x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit The 64bit machine check code is in many ways much better than the 32bit machine check code: it is more specification compliant, is cleaner, only has a single code base versus one per CPU, has better infrastructure for recovery, has a cleaner way to communicate with user space etc. etc. Use the 64bit code for 32bit too. This is the second attempt to do this. There was one a couple of years ago to unify this code for 32bit and 64bit. Back then this ran into some trouble with K7s and was reverted. I believe this time the K7 problems (and some others) are addressed. I went over the old handlers and was very careful to retain all quirks. But of course this needs a lot of testing on old systems. On newer 64bit capable systems I don't expect much problems because they have been already tested with the 64bit kernel. I made this a CONFIG for now that still allows to select the old machine check code. This is mostly to make testing easier, if someone runs into a problem we can ask them to try with the CONFIG switched. The new code is default y for more coverage. Once there is confidence the 64bit code works well on older hardware too the CONFIG_X86_OLD_MCE and the associated code can be easily removed. This causes a behaviour change for 32bit installations. They now have to install the mcelog package to be able to log corrected machine checks. The 64bit machine check code only handles CPUs which support the standard Intel machine check architecture described in the IA32 SDM. The 32bit code has special support for some older CPUs which have non standard machine check architectures, in particular WinChip C3 and Intel P5. I made those a separate CONFIG option and kept them for now. The WinChip variant could be probably removed without too much pain, it doesn't really do anything interesting. P5 is also disabled by default (like it was before) because many motherboards have it miswired, but according to Alan Cox a few embedded setups use that one. Forward ported/heavily changed version of old patch, original patch included review/fixes from Thomas Gleixner, Bert Wesarg. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-04-28 17:07:31 +00:00
static void __cpuinit mce_ancient_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
if (c->x86 != 5)
return;
switch (c->x86_vendor) {
case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
intel_p5_mcheck_init(c);
x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit The 64bit machine check code is in many ways much better than the 32bit machine check code: it is more specification compliant, is cleaner, only has a single code base versus one per CPU, has better infrastructure for recovery, has a cleaner way to communicate with user space etc. etc. Use the 64bit code for 32bit too. This is the second attempt to do this. There was one a couple of years ago to unify this code for 32bit and 64bit. Back then this ran into some trouble with K7s and was reverted. I believe this time the K7 problems (and some others) are addressed. I went over the old handlers and was very careful to retain all quirks. But of course this needs a lot of testing on old systems. On newer 64bit capable systems I don't expect much problems because they have been already tested with the 64bit kernel. I made this a CONFIG for now that still allows to select the old machine check code. This is mostly to make testing easier, if someone runs into a problem we can ask them to try with the CONFIG switched. The new code is default y for more coverage. Once there is confidence the 64bit code works well on older hardware too the CONFIG_X86_OLD_MCE and the associated code can be easily removed. This causes a behaviour change for 32bit installations. They now have to install the mcelog package to be able to log corrected machine checks. The 64bit machine check code only handles CPUs which support the standard Intel machine check architecture described in the IA32 SDM. The 32bit code has special support for some older CPUs which have non standard machine check architectures, in particular WinChip C3 and Intel P5. I made those a separate CONFIG option and kept them for now. The WinChip variant could be probably removed without too much pain, it doesn't really do anything interesting. P5 is also disabled by default (like it was before) because many motherboards have it miswired, but according to Alan Cox a few embedded setups use that one. Forward ported/heavily changed version of old patch, original patch included review/fixes from Thomas Gleixner, Bert Wesarg. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-04-28 17:07:31 +00:00
break;
case X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR:
winchip_mcheck_init(c);
break;
}
}
static void mce_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
switch (c->x86_vendor) {
case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
mce_intel_feature_init(c);
break;
case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
mce_amd_feature_init(c);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
static void mce_init_timer(void)
{
struct timer_list *t = &__get_cpu_var(mce_timer);
int *n = &__get_cpu_var(mce_next_interval);
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
if (mce_ignore_ce)
return;
*n = check_interval * HZ;
if (!*n)
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
return;
setup_timer(t, mcheck_timer, smp_processor_id());
t->expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + *n);
add_timer_on(t, smp_processor_id());
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
}
/* Handle unconfigured int18 (should never happen) */
static void unexpected_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "CPU#%d: Unexpected int18 (Machine Check).\n",
smp_processor_id());
}
/* Call the installed machine check handler for this CPU setup. */
void (*machine_check_vector)(struct pt_regs *, long error_code) =
unexpected_machine_check;
/*
* Called for each booted CPU to set up machine checks.
* Must be called with preempt off:
*/
void __cpuinit mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit The 64bit machine check code is in many ways much better than the 32bit machine check code: it is more specification compliant, is cleaner, only has a single code base versus one per CPU, has better infrastructure for recovery, has a cleaner way to communicate with user space etc. etc. Use the 64bit code for 32bit too. This is the second attempt to do this. There was one a couple of years ago to unify this code for 32bit and 64bit. Back then this ran into some trouble with K7s and was reverted. I believe this time the K7 problems (and some others) are addressed. I went over the old handlers and was very careful to retain all quirks. But of course this needs a lot of testing on old systems. On newer 64bit capable systems I don't expect much problems because they have been already tested with the 64bit kernel. I made this a CONFIG for now that still allows to select the old machine check code. This is mostly to make testing easier, if someone runs into a problem we can ask them to try with the CONFIG switched. The new code is default y for more coverage. Once there is confidence the 64bit code works well on older hardware too the CONFIG_X86_OLD_MCE and the associated code can be easily removed. This causes a behaviour change for 32bit installations. They now have to install the mcelog package to be able to log corrected machine checks. The 64bit machine check code only handles CPUs which support the standard Intel machine check architecture described in the IA32 SDM. The 32bit code has special support for some older CPUs which have non standard machine check architectures, in particular WinChip C3 and Intel P5. I made those a separate CONFIG option and kept them for now. The WinChip variant could be probably removed without too much pain, it doesn't really do anything interesting. P5 is also disabled by default (like it was before) because many motherboards have it miswired, but according to Alan Cox a few embedded setups use that one. Forward ported/heavily changed version of old patch, original patch included review/fixes from Thomas Gleixner, Bert Wesarg. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-04-28 17:07:31 +00:00
if (mce_disabled)
return;
mce_ancient_init(c);
if (!mce_available(c))
return;
x86, mce: Don't initialize MCEs on unknown CPUs An older test-box started hanging at the following point during bootup: [ 0.022996] Mount-cache hash table entries: 512 [ 0.024996] Initializing cgroup subsys debug [ 0.025996] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuacct [ 0.026995] Initializing cgroup subsys devices [ 0.027995] Initializing cgroup subsys freezer [ 0.028995] mce: CPU supports 5 MCE banks I've bisected it down to commit 4efc0670 ("x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit"), which utilizes the MCE code on 32-bit systems too. The problem is caused by this detail in my config: # CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL is not set This disables the quirks in mce_cpu_quirks() but still enables MCE support - which then hangs due to the missing quirk workaround needed on this CPU: if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 0x1A && banks > 0) mce_banks[0].init = 0; The safe solution is to not initialize MCEs if we dont know on what CPU we are running (or if that CPU's support code got disabled in the config). Also be a bit more defensive on 32-bit systems: dont do a boot-time dump of pending MCEs not just on the specific system that we found a problem with (Pentium-M), but earlier ones as well. Now this problem is probably not common and disabling CPU support is rare - but still being more defensive in something we turned on for a wide range of CPUs is prudent. Cc: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> LKML-Reference: Message-ID: <4A88E3E4.40506@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-17 08:19:00 +00:00
if (mce_cap_init() < 0 || mce_cpu_quirks(c) < 0) {
mce_disabled = 1;
return;
}
machine_check_vector = do_machine_check;
mce_init();
mce_cpu_features(c);
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
mce_init_timer();
x86, mce: support action-optional machine checks Newer Intel CPUs support a new class of machine checks called recoverable action optional. Action Optional means that the CPU detected some form of corruption in the background and tells the OS about using a machine check exception. The OS can then take appropiate action, like killing the process with the corrupted data or logging the event properly to disk. This is done by the new generic high level memory failure handler added in a earlier patch. The high level handler takes the address with the failed memory and does the appropiate action, like killing the process. In this version of the patch the high level handler is stubbed out with a weak function to not create a direct dependency on the hwpoison branch. The high level handler cannot be directly called from the machine check exception though, because it has to run in a defined process context to be able to sleep when taking VM locks (it is not expected to sleep for a long time, just do so in some exceptional cases like lock contention) Thus the MCE handler has to queue a work item for process context, trigger process context and then call the high level handler from there. This patch adds two path to process context: through a per thread kernel exit notify_user() callback or through a high priority work item. The first runs when the process exits back to user space, the other when it goes to sleep and there is no higher priority process. The machine check handler will schedule both, and whoever runs first will grab the event. This is done because quick reaction to this event is critical to avoid a potential more fatal machine check when the corruption is consumed. There is a simple lock less ring buffer to queue the corrupted addresses between the exception handler and the process context handler. Then in process context it just calls the high level VM code with the corrupted PFNs. The code adds the required code to extract the failed address from the CPU's machine check registers. It doesn't try to handle all possible cases -- the specification has 6 different ways to specify memory address -- but only the linear address. Most of the required checking has been already done earlier in the mce_severity rule checking engine. Following the Intel recommendations Action Optional errors are only enabled for known situations (encoded in MCACODs). The errors are ignored otherwise, because they are action optional. v2: Improve comment, disable preemption while processing ring buffer (reported by Ying Huang) Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:59 +00:00
INIT_WORK(&__get_cpu_var(mce_work), mce_process_work);
}
/*
* Character device to read and clear the MCE log.
*/
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mce_state_lock);
static int open_count; /* #times opened */
static int open_exclu; /* already open exclusive? */
static int mce_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
spin_lock(&mce_state_lock);
if (open_exclu || (open_count && (file->f_flags & O_EXCL))) {
spin_unlock(&mce_state_lock);
return -EBUSY;
}
if (file->f_flags & O_EXCL)
open_exclu = 1;
open_count++;
spin_unlock(&mce_state_lock);
x86_64: mcelog tolerant level cleanup Background: The MCE handler has several paths that it can take, depending on various conditions of the MCE status and the value of the 'tolerant' knob. The exact semantics are not well defined and the code is a bit twisty. Description: This patch makes the MCE handler's behavior more clear by documenting the behavior for various 'tolerant' levels. It also fixes or enhances several small things in the handler. Specifically: * If RIPV is set it is not safe to restart, so set the 'no way out' flag rather than the 'kill it' flag. * Don't panic() on correctable MCEs. * If the _OVER bit is set *and* the _UC bit is set (meaning possibly dropped uncorrected errors), set the 'no way out' flag. * Use EIPV for testing whether an app can be killed (SIGBUS) rather than RIPV. According to docs, EIPV indicates that the error is related to the IP, while RIPV simply means the IP is valid to restart from. * Don't clear the MCi_STATUS registers until after the panic() path. This leaves the status bits set after the panic() so clever BIOSes can find them (and dumb BIOSes can do nothing). This patch also calls nonseekable_open() in mce_open (as suggested by akpm). Result: Tolerant levels behave almost identically to how they always have, but not it's well defined. There's a slightly higher chance of panic()ing when multiple errors happen (a good thing, IMHO). If you take an MBE and panic(), the error status bits are not cleared. Alternatives: None. Testing: I used software to inject correctable and uncorrectable errors. With tolerant = 3, the system usually survives. With tolerant = 2, the system usually panic()s (PCC) but not always. With tolerant = 1, the system always panic()s. When the system panic()s, the BIOS is able to detect that the cause of death was an MC4. I was not able to reproduce the case of a non-PCC error in userspace, with EIPV, with (tolerant < 3). That will be rare at best. Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:37 +00:00
return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
}
static int mce_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
spin_lock(&mce_state_lock);
open_count--;
open_exclu = 0;
spin_unlock(&mce_state_lock);
return 0;
}
static void collect_tscs(void *data)
{
unsigned long *cpu_tsc = (unsigned long *)data;
rdtscll(cpu_tsc[smp_processor_id()]);
}
static DEFINE_MUTEX(mce_read_mutex);
static ssize_t mce_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t usize,
loff_t *off)
{
char __user *buf = ubuf;
unsigned long *cpu_tsc;
unsigned prev, next;
int i, err;
cpu_tsc = kmalloc(nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(long), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cpu_tsc)
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&mce_read_mutex);
next = rcu_dereference(mcelog.next);
/* Only supports full reads right now */
if (*off != 0 || usize < MCE_LOG_LEN*sizeof(struct mce)) {
mutex_unlock(&mce_read_mutex);
kfree(cpu_tsc);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = 0;
prev = 0;
do {
for (i = prev; i < next; i++) {
unsigned long start = jiffies;
while (!mcelog.entry[i].finished) {
if (time_after_eq(jiffies, start + 2)) {
memset(mcelog.entry + i, 0,
sizeof(struct mce));
goto timeout;
}
cpu_relax();
}
smp_rmb();
err |= copy_to_user(buf, mcelog.entry + i,
sizeof(struct mce));
buf += sizeof(struct mce);
timeout:
;
}
memset(mcelog.entry + prev, 0,
(next - prev) * sizeof(struct mce));
prev = next;
next = cmpxchg(&mcelog.next, prev, 0);
} while (next != prev);
synchronize_sched();
/*
* Collect entries that were still getting written before the
* synchronize.
*/
on_each_cpu(collect_tscs, cpu_tsc, 1);
for (i = next; i < MCE_LOG_LEN; i++) {
if (mcelog.entry[i].finished &&
mcelog.entry[i].tsc < cpu_tsc[mcelog.entry[i].cpu]) {
err |= copy_to_user(buf, mcelog.entry+i,
sizeof(struct mce));
smp_rmb();
buf += sizeof(struct mce);
memset(&mcelog.entry[i], 0, sizeof(struct mce));
}
}
mutex_unlock(&mce_read_mutex);
kfree(cpu_tsc);
return err ? -EFAULT : buf - ubuf;
}
x86_64: support poll() on /dev/mcelog Background: /dev/mcelog is typically polled manually. This is less than optimal for situations where accurate accounting of MCEs is important. Calling poll() on /dev/mcelog does not work. Description: This patch adds support for poll() to /dev/mcelog. This results in immediate wakeup of user apps whenever the poller finds MCEs. Because the exception handler can not take any locks, it can not call the wakeup itself. Instead, it uses a thread_info flag (TIF_MCE_NOTIFY) which is caught at the next return from interrupt or exit from idle, calling the mce_user_notify() routine. This patch also disables the "fake panic" path of the mce_panic(), because it results in printk()s in the exception handler and crashy systems. This patch also does some small cleanup for essentially unused variables, and moves the user notification into the body of the poller, so it is only called once per poll, rather than once per CPU. Result: Applications can now poll() on /dev/mcelog. When an error is logged (whether through the poller or through an exception) the applications are woken up promptly. This should not affect any previous behaviors. If no MCEs are being logged, there is no overhead. Alternatives: I considered simply supporting poll() through the poller and not using TIF_MCE_NOTIFY at all. However, the time between an uncorrectable error happening and the user application being notified is *the*most* critical window for us. Many uncorrectable errors can be logged to the network if given a chance. I also considered doing the MCE poll directly from the idle notifier, but decided that was overkill. Testing: I used an error-injecting DIMM to create lots of correctable DRAM errors and verified that my user app is woken up in sync with the polling interval. I also used the northbridge to inject uncorrectable ECC errors, and verified (printk() to the rescue) that the notify routine is called and the user app does wake up. I built with PREEMPT on and off, and verified that my machine survives MCEs. [wli@holomorphy.com: build fix] Signed-off-by: Tim Hockin <thockin@google.com> Signed-off-by: William Irwin <bill.irwin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-21 15:10:36 +00:00
static unsigned int mce_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
poll_wait(file, &mce_wait, wait);
if (rcu_dereference(mcelog.next))
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
return 0;
}
static long mce_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case MCE_GET_RECORD_LEN:
return put_user(sizeof(struct mce), p);
case MCE_GET_LOG_LEN:
return put_user(MCE_LOG_LEN, p);
case MCE_GETCLEAR_FLAGS: {
unsigned flags;
do {
flags = mcelog.flags;
} while (cmpxchg(&mcelog.flags, flags, 0) != flags);
return put_user(flags, p);
}
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
}
/* Modified in mce-inject.c, so not static or const */
struct file_operations mce_chrdev_ops = {
.open = mce_open,
.release = mce_release,
.read = mce_read,
.poll = mce_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = mce_ioctl,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_chrdev_ops);
static struct miscdevice mce_log_device = {
MISC_MCELOG_MINOR,
"mcelog",
&mce_chrdev_ops,
};
/*
* mce=off Disables machine check
* mce=no_cmci Disables CMCI
* mce=dont_log_ce Clears corrected events silently, no log created for CEs.
* mce=ignore_ce Disables polling and CMCI, corrected events are not cleared.
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
* mce=TOLERANCELEVEL[,monarchtimeout] (number, see above)
* monarchtimeout is how long to wait for other CPUs on machine
* check, or 0 to not wait
* mce=bootlog Log MCEs from before booting. Disabled by default on AMD.
* mce=nobootlog Don't log MCEs from before booting.
*/
static int __init mcheck_enable(char *str)
{
if (*str == 0) {
x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit The 64bit machine check code is in many ways much better than the 32bit machine check code: it is more specification compliant, is cleaner, only has a single code base versus one per CPU, has better infrastructure for recovery, has a cleaner way to communicate with user space etc. etc. Use the 64bit code for 32bit too. This is the second attempt to do this. There was one a couple of years ago to unify this code for 32bit and 64bit. Back then this ran into some trouble with K7s and was reverted. I believe this time the K7 problems (and some others) are addressed. I went over the old handlers and was very careful to retain all quirks. But of course this needs a lot of testing on old systems. On newer 64bit capable systems I don't expect much problems because they have been already tested with the 64bit kernel. I made this a CONFIG for now that still allows to select the old machine check code. This is mostly to make testing easier, if someone runs into a problem we can ask them to try with the CONFIG switched. The new code is default y for more coverage. Once there is confidence the 64bit code works well on older hardware too the CONFIG_X86_OLD_MCE and the associated code can be easily removed. This causes a behaviour change for 32bit installations. They now have to install the mcelog package to be able to log corrected machine checks. The 64bit machine check code only handles CPUs which support the standard Intel machine check architecture described in the IA32 SDM. The 32bit code has special support for some older CPUs which have non standard machine check architectures, in particular WinChip C3 and Intel P5. I made those a separate CONFIG option and kept them for now. The WinChip variant could be probably removed without too much pain, it doesn't really do anything interesting. P5 is also disabled by default (like it was before) because many motherboards have it miswired, but according to Alan Cox a few embedded setups use that one. Forward ported/heavily changed version of old patch, original patch included review/fixes from Thomas Gleixner, Bert Wesarg. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-04-28 17:07:31 +00:00
enable_p5_mce();
return 1;
}
x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit The 64bit machine check code is in many ways much better than the 32bit machine check code: it is more specification compliant, is cleaner, only has a single code base versus one per CPU, has better infrastructure for recovery, has a cleaner way to communicate with user space etc. etc. Use the 64bit code for 32bit too. This is the second attempt to do this. There was one a couple of years ago to unify this code for 32bit and 64bit. Back then this ran into some trouble with K7s and was reverted. I believe this time the K7 problems (and some others) are addressed. I went over the old handlers and was very careful to retain all quirks. But of course this needs a lot of testing on old systems. On newer 64bit capable systems I don't expect much problems because they have been already tested with the 64bit kernel. I made this a CONFIG for now that still allows to select the old machine check code. This is mostly to make testing easier, if someone runs into a problem we can ask them to try with the CONFIG switched. The new code is default y for more coverage. Once there is confidence the 64bit code works well on older hardware too the CONFIG_X86_OLD_MCE and the associated code can be easily removed. This causes a behaviour change for 32bit installations. They now have to install the mcelog package to be able to log corrected machine checks. The 64bit machine check code only handles CPUs which support the standard Intel machine check architecture described in the IA32 SDM. The 32bit code has special support for some older CPUs which have non standard machine check architectures, in particular WinChip C3 and Intel P5. I made those a separate CONFIG option and kept them for now. The WinChip variant could be probably removed without too much pain, it doesn't really do anything interesting. P5 is also disabled by default (like it was before) because many motherboards have it miswired, but according to Alan Cox a few embedded setups use that one. Forward ported/heavily changed version of old patch, original patch included review/fixes from Thomas Gleixner, Bert Wesarg. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-04-28 17:07:31 +00:00
if (*str == '=')
str++;
if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
mce_disabled = 1;
else if (!strcmp(str, "no_cmci"))
mce_cmci_disabled = 1;
else if (!strcmp(str, "dont_log_ce"))
mce_dont_log_ce = 1;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ignore_ce"))
mce_ignore_ce = 1;
else if (!strcmp(str, "bootlog") || !strcmp(str, "nobootlog"))
mce_bootlog = (str[0] == 'b');
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
else if (isdigit(str[0])) {
get_option(&str, &tolerant);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
if (*str == ',') {
++str;
get_option(&str, &monarch_timeout);
}
} else {
x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit The 64bit machine check code is in many ways much better than the 32bit machine check code: it is more specification compliant, is cleaner, only has a single code base versus one per CPU, has better infrastructure for recovery, has a cleaner way to communicate with user space etc. etc. Use the 64bit code for 32bit too. This is the second attempt to do this. There was one a couple of years ago to unify this code for 32bit and 64bit. Back then this ran into some trouble with K7s and was reverted. I believe this time the K7 problems (and some others) are addressed. I went over the old handlers and was very careful to retain all quirks. But of course this needs a lot of testing on old systems. On newer 64bit capable systems I don't expect much problems because they have been already tested with the 64bit kernel. I made this a CONFIG for now that still allows to select the old machine check code. This is mostly to make testing easier, if someone runs into a problem we can ask them to try with the CONFIG switched. The new code is default y for more coverage. Once there is confidence the 64bit code works well on older hardware too the CONFIG_X86_OLD_MCE and the associated code can be easily removed. This causes a behaviour change for 32bit installations. They now have to install the mcelog package to be able to log corrected machine checks. The 64bit machine check code only handles CPUs which support the standard Intel machine check architecture described in the IA32 SDM. The 32bit code has special support for some older CPUs which have non standard machine check architectures, in particular WinChip C3 and Intel P5. I made those a separate CONFIG option and kept them for now. The WinChip variant could be probably removed without too much pain, it doesn't really do anything interesting. P5 is also disabled by default (like it was before) because many motherboards have it miswired, but according to Alan Cox a few embedded setups use that one. Forward ported/heavily changed version of old patch, original patch included review/fixes from Thomas Gleixner, Bert Wesarg. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-04-28 17:07:31 +00:00
printk(KERN_INFO "mce argument %s ignored. Please use /sys\n",
str);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
x86, mce: use 64bit machine check code on 32bit The 64bit machine check code is in many ways much better than the 32bit machine check code: it is more specification compliant, is cleaner, only has a single code base versus one per CPU, has better infrastructure for recovery, has a cleaner way to communicate with user space etc. etc. Use the 64bit code for 32bit too. This is the second attempt to do this. There was one a couple of years ago to unify this code for 32bit and 64bit. Back then this ran into some trouble with K7s and was reverted. I believe this time the K7 problems (and some others) are addressed. I went over the old handlers and was very careful to retain all quirks. But of course this needs a lot of testing on old systems. On newer 64bit capable systems I don't expect much problems because they have been already tested with the 64bit kernel. I made this a CONFIG for now that still allows to select the old machine check code. This is mostly to make testing easier, if someone runs into a problem we can ask them to try with the CONFIG switched. The new code is default y for more coverage. Once there is confidence the 64bit code works well on older hardware too the CONFIG_X86_OLD_MCE and the associated code can be easily removed. This causes a behaviour change for 32bit installations. They now have to install the mcelog package to be able to log corrected machine checks. The 64bit machine check code only handles CPUs which support the standard Intel machine check architecture described in the IA32 SDM. The 32bit code has special support for some older CPUs which have non standard machine check architectures, in particular WinChip C3 and Intel P5. I made those a separate CONFIG option and kept them for now. The WinChip variant could be probably removed without too much pain, it doesn't really do anything interesting. P5 is also disabled by default (like it was before) because many motherboards have it miswired, but according to Alan Cox a few embedded setups use that one. Forward ported/heavily changed version of old patch, original patch included review/fixes from Thomas Gleixner, Bert Wesarg. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-04-28 17:07:31 +00:00
__setup("mce", mcheck_enable);
/*
* Sysfs support
*/
/*
* Disable machine checks on suspend and shutdown. We can't really handle
* them later.
*/
static int mce_disable(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
if (b->init)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(i), 0);
}
return 0;
}
static int mce_suspend(struct sys_device *dev, pm_message_t state)
{
return mce_disable();
}
static int mce_shutdown(struct sys_device *dev)
{
return mce_disable();
}
/*
* On resume clear all MCE state. Don't want to see leftovers from the BIOS.
* Only one CPU is active at this time, the others get re-added later using
* CPU hotplug:
*/
static int mce_resume(struct sys_device *dev)
{
mce_init();
mce_cpu_features(&current_cpu_data);
return 0;
}
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
static void mce_cpu_restart(void *data)
{
del_timer_sync(&__get_cpu_var(mce_timer));
if (!mce_available(&current_cpu_data))
return;
mce_init();
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
mce_init_timer();
}
/* Reinit MCEs after user configuration changes */
static void mce_restart(void)
{
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
on_each_cpu(mce_cpu_restart, NULL, 1);
}
/* Toggle features for corrected errors */
static void mce_disable_ce(void *all)
{
if (!mce_available(&current_cpu_data))
return;
if (all)
del_timer_sync(&__get_cpu_var(mce_timer));
cmci_clear();
}
static void mce_enable_ce(void *all)
{
if (!mce_available(&current_cpu_data))
return;
cmci_reenable();
cmci_recheck();
if (all)
mce_init_timer();
}
static struct sysdev_class mce_sysclass = {
.suspend = mce_suspend,
.shutdown = mce_shutdown,
.resume = mce_resume,
.name = "machinecheck",
};
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sys_device, mce_dev);
__cpuinitdata
void (*threshold_cpu_callback)(unsigned long action, unsigned int cpu);
static inline struct mce_bank *attr_to_bank(struct sysdev_attribute *attr)
{
return container_of(attr, struct mce_bank, attr);
}
static ssize_t show_bank(struct sys_device *s, struct sysdev_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%llx\n", attr_to_bank(attr)->ctl);
}
static ssize_t set_bank(struct sys_device *s, struct sysdev_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t size)
{
u64 new;
if (strict_strtoull(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
attr_to_bank(attr)->ctl = new;
mce_restart();
return size;
}
static ssize_t
show_trigger(struct sys_device *s, struct sysdev_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
strcpy(buf, mce_helper);
strcat(buf, "\n");
return strlen(mce_helper) + 1;
}
static ssize_t set_trigger(struct sys_device *s, struct sysdev_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t siz)
{
char *p;
strncpy(mce_helper, buf, sizeof(mce_helper));
mce_helper[sizeof(mce_helper)-1] = 0;
p = strchr(mce_helper, '\n');
if (p)
*p = 0;
return strlen(mce_helper) + !!p;
}
static ssize_t set_ignore_ce(struct sys_device *s,
struct sysdev_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t size)
{
u64 new;
if (strict_strtoull(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (mce_ignore_ce ^ !!new) {
if (new) {
/* disable ce features */
on_each_cpu(mce_disable_ce, (void *)1, 1);
mce_ignore_ce = 1;
} else {
/* enable ce features */
mce_ignore_ce = 0;
on_each_cpu(mce_enable_ce, (void *)1, 1);
}
}
return size;
}
static ssize_t set_cmci_disabled(struct sys_device *s,
struct sysdev_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t size)
{
u64 new;
if (strict_strtoull(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (mce_cmci_disabled ^ !!new) {
if (new) {
/* disable cmci */
on_each_cpu(mce_disable_ce, NULL, 1);
mce_cmci_disabled = 1;
} else {
/* enable cmci */
mce_cmci_disabled = 0;
on_each_cpu(mce_enable_ce, NULL, 1);
}
}
return size;
}
static ssize_t store_int_with_restart(struct sys_device *s,
struct sysdev_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret = sysdev_store_int(s, attr, buf, size);
mce_restart();
return ret;
}
static SYSDEV_ATTR(trigger, 0644, show_trigger, set_trigger);
static SYSDEV_INT_ATTR(tolerant, 0644, tolerant);
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
static SYSDEV_INT_ATTR(monarch_timeout, 0644, monarch_timeout);
static SYSDEV_INT_ATTR(dont_log_ce, 0644, mce_dont_log_ce);
static struct sysdev_ext_attribute attr_check_interval = {
_SYSDEV_ATTR(check_interval, 0644, sysdev_show_int,
store_int_with_restart),
&check_interval
};
static struct sysdev_ext_attribute attr_ignore_ce = {
_SYSDEV_ATTR(ignore_ce, 0644, sysdev_show_int, set_ignore_ce),
&mce_ignore_ce
};
static struct sysdev_ext_attribute attr_cmci_disabled = {
_SYSDEV_ATTR(cmci_disabled, 0644, sysdev_show_int, set_cmci_disabled),
&mce_cmci_disabled
};
static struct sysdev_attribute *mce_attrs[] = {
&attr_tolerant.attr,
&attr_check_interval.attr,
&attr_trigger,
x86, mce: switch x86 machine check handler to Monarch election. On Intel platforms machine check exceptions are always broadcast to all CPUs. This patch makes the machine check handler synchronize all these machine checks, elect a Monarch to handle the event and collect the worst event from all CPUs and then process it first. This has some advantages: - When there is a truly data corrupting error the system panics as quickly as possible. This improves containment of corrupted data and makes sure the corrupted data never hits stable storage. - The panics are synchronized and do not reenter the panic code on multiple CPUs (which currently does not handle this well). - All the errors are reported. Currently it often happens that another CPU happens to do the panic first, but reports useless information (empty machine check) because the real error happened on another CPU which came in later. This is a big advantage on Nehalem where the 8 threads per CPU lead to often the wrong CPU winning the race and dumping useless information on a machine check. The problem also occurs in a less severe form on older CPUs. - The system can detect when no CPUs detected a machine check and shut down the system. This can happen when one CPU is so badly hung that that it cannot process a machine check anymore or when some external agent wants to stop the system by asserting the machine check pin. This follows Intel hardware recommendations. - This matches the recommended error model by the CPU designers. - The events can be output in true severity order - When a panic happens on another CPU it makes sure to be actually be able to process the stop IPI by enabling interrupts. The code is extremly careful to handle timeouts while waiting for other CPUs. It can't rely on the normal timing mechanisms (jiffies, ktime_get) because of its asynchronous/lockless nature, so it uses own timeouts using ndelay() and a "SPINUNIT" The timeout is configurable. By default it waits for upto one second for the other CPUs. This can be also disabled. From some informal testing AMD systems do not see to broadcast machine checks, so right now it's always disabled by default on non Intel CPUs or also on very old Intel systems. Includes fixes from Ying Huang Fixed a "ecception" in a comment (H.Seto) Moved global_nwo reset later based on suggestion from H.Seto v2: Avoid duplicate messages [ Impact: feature, fixes long standing problems. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-05-27 19:56:55 +00:00
&attr_monarch_timeout.attr,
&attr_dont_log_ce.attr,
&attr_ignore_ce.attr,
&attr_cmci_disabled.attr,
NULL
};
static cpumask_var_t mce_dev_initialized;
/* Per cpu sysdev init. All of the cpus still share the same ctrl bank: */
static __cpuinit int mce_create_device(unsigned int cpu)
{
int err;
int i, j;
if (!mce_available(&boot_cpu_data))
return -EIO;
memset(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu).kobj, 0, sizeof(struct kobject));
per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu).id = cpu;
per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu).cls = &mce_sysclass;
err = sysdev_register(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu));
if (err)
return err;
for (i = 0; mce_attrs[i]; i++) {
err = sysdev_create_file(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu), mce_attrs[i]);
if (err)
goto error;
}
for (j = 0; j < banks; j++) {
err = sysdev_create_file(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu),
&mce_banks[j].attr);
if (err)
goto error2;
}
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mce_dev_initialized);
return 0;
error2:
while (--j >= 0)
sysdev_remove_file(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu), &mce_banks[j].attr);
error:
while (--i >= 0)
sysdev_remove_file(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu), &mce_banks[i].attr);
sysdev_unregister(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu));
return err;
}
static __cpuinit void mce_remove_device(unsigned int cpu)
{
int i;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mce_dev_initialized))
return;
for (i = 0; mce_attrs[i]; i++)
sysdev_remove_file(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu), mce_attrs[i]);
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++)
sysdev_remove_file(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu), &mce_banks[i].attr);
sysdev_unregister(&per_cpu(mce_dev, cpu));
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mce_dev_initialized);
}
/* Make sure there are no machine checks on offlined CPUs. */
static void mce_disable_cpu(void *h)
{
x86, mce, cmci: add CMCI support Impact: Major new feature Intel CMCI (Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) is a new feature on Nehalem CPUs. It allows the CPU to trigger interrupts on corrected events, which allows faster reaction to them instead of with the traditional polling timer. Also use CMCI to discover shared banks. Machine check banks can be shared by CPU threads or even cores. Using the CMCI enable bit it is possible to detect the fact that another CPU already saw a specific bank. Use this to assign shared banks only to one CPU to avoid reporting duplicated events. On CPU hot unplug bank sharing is re discovered. This is done using a thread that cycles through all the CPUs. To avoid races between the poller and CMCI we only poll for banks that are not CMCI capable and only check CMCI owned banks on a interrupt. The shared banks ownership information is currently only used for CMCI interrupts, not polled banks. The sharing discovery code follows the algorithm recommended in the IA32 SDM Vol3a 14.5.2.1 The CMCI interrupt handler just calls the machine check poller to pick up the machine check event that caused the interrupt. I decided not to implement a separate threshold event like the AMD version has, because the threshold is always one currently and adding another event didn't seem to add any value. Some code inspired by Yunhong Jiang's Xen implementation, which was in term inspired by a earlier CMCI implementation by me. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:49:36 +00:00
unsigned long action = *(unsigned long *)h;
int i;
if (!mce_available(&current_cpu_data))
return;
x86, mce, cmci: add CMCI support Impact: Major new feature Intel CMCI (Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) is a new feature on Nehalem CPUs. It allows the CPU to trigger interrupts on corrected events, which allows faster reaction to them instead of with the traditional polling timer. Also use CMCI to discover shared banks. Machine check banks can be shared by CPU threads or even cores. Using the CMCI enable bit it is possible to detect the fact that another CPU already saw a specific bank. Use this to assign shared banks only to one CPU to avoid reporting duplicated events. On CPU hot unplug bank sharing is re discovered. This is done using a thread that cycles through all the CPUs. To avoid races between the poller and CMCI we only poll for banks that are not CMCI capable and only check CMCI owned banks on a interrupt. The shared banks ownership information is currently only used for CMCI interrupts, not polled banks. The sharing discovery code follows the algorithm recommended in the IA32 SDM Vol3a 14.5.2.1 The CMCI interrupt handler just calls the machine check poller to pick up the machine check event that caused the interrupt. I decided not to implement a separate threshold event like the AMD version has, because the threshold is always one currently and adding another event didn't seem to add any value. Some code inspired by Yunhong Jiang's Xen implementation, which was in term inspired by a earlier CMCI implementation by me. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:49:36 +00:00
if (!(action & CPU_TASKS_FROZEN))
cmci_clear();
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
if (b->init)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(i), 0);
}
}
static void mce_reenable_cpu(void *h)
{
x86, mce, cmci: add CMCI support Impact: Major new feature Intel CMCI (Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) is a new feature on Nehalem CPUs. It allows the CPU to trigger interrupts on corrected events, which allows faster reaction to them instead of with the traditional polling timer. Also use CMCI to discover shared banks. Machine check banks can be shared by CPU threads or even cores. Using the CMCI enable bit it is possible to detect the fact that another CPU already saw a specific bank. Use this to assign shared banks only to one CPU to avoid reporting duplicated events. On CPU hot unplug bank sharing is re discovered. This is done using a thread that cycles through all the CPUs. To avoid races between the poller and CMCI we only poll for banks that are not CMCI capable and only check CMCI owned banks on a interrupt. The shared banks ownership information is currently only used for CMCI interrupts, not polled banks. The sharing discovery code follows the algorithm recommended in the IA32 SDM Vol3a 14.5.2.1 The CMCI interrupt handler just calls the machine check poller to pick up the machine check event that caused the interrupt. I decided not to implement a separate threshold event like the AMD version has, because the threshold is always one currently and adding another event didn't seem to add any value. Some code inspired by Yunhong Jiang's Xen implementation, which was in term inspired by a earlier CMCI implementation by me. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:49:36 +00:00
unsigned long action = *(unsigned long *)h;
int i;
if (!mce_available(&current_cpu_data))
return;
x86, mce, cmci: add CMCI support Impact: Major new feature Intel CMCI (Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) is a new feature on Nehalem CPUs. It allows the CPU to trigger interrupts on corrected events, which allows faster reaction to them instead of with the traditional polling timer. Also use CMCI to discover shared banks. Machine check banks can be shared by CPU threads or even cores. Using the CMCI enable bit it is possible to detect the fact that another CPU already saw a specific bank. Use this to assign shared banks only to one CPU to avoid reporting duplicated events. On CPU hot unplug bank sharing is re discovered. This is done using a thread that cycles through all the CPUs. To avoid races between the poller and CMCI we only poll for banks that are not CMCI capable and only check CMCI owned banks on a interrupt. The shared banks ownership information is currently only used for CMCI interrupts, not polled banks. The sharing discovery code follows the algorithm recommended in the IA32 SDM Vol3a 14.5.2.1 The CMCI interrupt handler just calls the machine check poller to pick up the machine check event that caused the interrupt. I decided not to implement a separate threshold event like the AMD version has, because the threshold is always one currently and adding another event didn't seem to add any value. Some code inspired by Yunhong Jiang's Xen implementation, which was in term inspired by a earlier CMCI implementation by me. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:49:36 +00:00
if (!(action & CPU_TASKS_FROZEN))
cmci_reenable();
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
if (b->init)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(i), b->ctl);
}
}
/* Get notified when a cpu comes on/off. Be hotplug friendly. */
static int __cpuinit
mce_cpu_callback(struct notifier_block *nfb, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
unsigned int cpu = (unsigned long)hcpu;
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
struct timer_list *t = &per_cpu(mce_timer, cpu);
switch (action) {
case CPU_ONLINE:
case CPU_ONLINE_FROZEN:
mce_create_device(cpu);
if (threshold_cpu_callback)
threshold_cpu_callback(action, cpu);
break;
case CPU_DEAD:
case CPU_DEAD_FROZEN:
if (threshold_cpu_callback)
threshold_cpu_callback(action, cpu);
mce_remove_device(cpu);
break;
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE_FROZEN:
del_timer_sync(t);
x86, mce, cmci: add CMCI support Impact: Major new feature Intel CMCI (Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) is a new feature on Nehalem CPUs. It allows the CPU to trigger interrupts on corrected events, which allows faster reaction to them instead of with the traditional polling timer. Also use CMCI to discover shared banks. Machine check banks can be shared by CPU threads or even cores. Using the CMCI enable bit it is possible to detect the fact that another CPU already saw a specific bank. Use this to assign shared banks only to one CPU to avoid reporting duplicated events. On CPU hot unplug bank sharing is re discovered. This is done using a thread that cycles through all the CPUs. To avoid races between the poller and CMCI we only poll for banks that are not CMCI capable and only check CMCI owned banks on a interrupt. The shared banks ownership information is currently only used for CMCI interrupts, not polled banks. The sharing discovery code follows the algorithm recommended in the IA32 SDM Vol3a 14.5.2.1 The CMCI interrupt handler just calls the machine check poller to pick up the machine check event that caused the interrupt. I decided not to implement a separate threshold event like the AMD version has, because the threshold is always one currently and adding another event didn't seem to add any value. Some code inspired by Yunhong Jiang's Xen implementation, which was in term inspired by a earlier CMCI implementation by me. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:49:36 +00:00
smp_call_function_single(cpu, mce_disable_cpu, &action, 1);
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
break;
case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
case CPU_DOWN_FAILED_FROZEN:
t->expires = round_jiffies(jiffies +
__get_cpu_var(mce_next_interval));
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
add_timer_on(t, cpu);
x86, mce, cmci: add CMCI support Impact: Major new feature Intel CMCI (Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) is a new feature on Nehalem CPUs. It allows the CPU to trigger interrupts on corrected events, which allows faster reaction to them instead of with the traditional polling timer. Also use CMCI to discover shared banks. Machine check banks can be shared by CPU threads or even cores. Using the CMCI enable bit it is possible to detect the fact that another CPU already saw a specific bank. Use this to assign shared banks only to one CPU to avoid reporting duplicated events. On CPU hot unplug bank sharing is re discovered. This is done using a thread that cycles through all the CPUs. To avoid races between the poller and CMCI we only poll for banks that are not CMCI capable and only check CMCI owned banks on a interrupt. The shared banks ownership information is currently only used for CMCI interrupts, not polled banks. The sharing discovery code follows the algorithm recommended in the IA32 SDM Vol3a 14.5.2.1 The CMCI interrupt handler just calls the machine check poller to pick up the machine check event that caused the interrupt. I decided not to implement a separate threshold event like the AMD version has, because the threshold is always one currently and adding another event didn't seem to add any value. Some code inspired by Yunhong Jiang's Xen implementation, which was in term inspired by a earlier CMCI implementation by me. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:49:36 +00:00
smp_call_function_single(cpu, mce_reenable_cpu, &action, 1);
break;
case CPU_POST_DEAD:
/* intentionally ignoring frozen here */
cmci_rediscover(cpu);
x86, mce: switch machine check polling to per CPU timer Impact: Higher priority bug fix The machine check poller runs a single timer and then broadcasted an IPI to all CPUs to check them. This leads to unnecessary synchronization between CPUs. The original CPU running the timer has to wait potentially a long time for all other CPUs answering. This is also real time unfriendly and in general inefficient. This was especially a problem on systems with a lot of events where the poller run with a higher frequency after processing some events. There could be more and more CPU time wasted with this, to the point of significantly slowing down machines. The machine check polling is actually fully independent per CPU, so there's no reason to not just do this all with per CPU timers. This patch implements that. Also switch the poller also to use standard timers instead of work queues. It was using work queues to be able to execute a user program on a event, but mce_notify_user() handles this case now with a separate callback. So instead always run the poll code in in a standard per CPU timer, which means that in the common case of not having to execute a trigger there will be less overhead. This allows to clean up the initialization significantly, because standard timers are already up when machine checks get init'ed. No multiple initialization functions. Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for some help. Cc: thockin@google.com v2: Use del_timer_sync() on cpu shutdown and don't try to handle migrated timers. v3: Add WARN_ON for timer running on unexpected CPU Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-02-12 12:39:29 +00:00
break;
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
static struct notifier_block mce_cpu_notifier __cpuinitdata = {
.notifier_call = mce_cpu_callback,
};
static __init void mce_init_banks(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
struct sysdev_attribute *a = &b->attr;
a->attr.name = b->attrname;
snprintf(b->attrname, ATTR_LEN, "bank%d", i);
a->attr.mode = 0644;
a->show = show_bank;
a->store = set_bank;
}
}
static __init int mce_init_device(void)
{
int err;
int i = 0;
if (!mce_available(&boot_cpu_data))
return -EIO;
zalloc_cpumask_var(&mce_dev_initialized, GFP_KERNEL);
mce_init_banks();
err = sysdev_class_register(&mce_sysclass);
if (err)
return err;
for_each_online_cpu(i) {
err = mce_create_device(i);
if (err)
return err;
}
register_hotcpu_notifier(&mce_cpu_notifier);
misc_register(&mce_log_device);
return err;
}
device_initcall(mce_init_device);
/*
* Old style boot options parsing. Only for compatibility.
*/
static int __init mcheck_disable(char *str)
{
mce_disabled = 1;
return 1;
}
__setup("nomce", mcheck_disable);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
struct dentry *mce_get_debugfs_dir(void)
{
static struct dentry *dmce;
if (!dmce)
dmce = debugfs_create_dir("mce", NULL);
return dmce;
}
static void mce_reset(void)
{
cpu_missing = 0;
atomic_set(&mce_fake_paniced, 0);
atomic_set(&mce_executing, 0);
atomic_set(&mce_callin, 0);
atomic_set(&global_nwo, 0);
}
static int fake_panic_get(void *data, u64 *val)
{
*val = fake_panic;
return 0;
}
static int fake_panic_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
mce_reset();
fake_panic = val;
return 0;
}
DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fake_panic_fops, fake_panic_get,
fake_panic_set, "%llu\n");
static int __init mce_debugfs_init(void)
{
struct dentry *dmce, *ffake_panic;
dmce = mce_get_debugfs_dir();
if (!dmce)
return -ENOMEM;
ffake_panic = debugfs_create_file("fake_panic", 0444, dmce, NULL,
&fake_panic_fops);
if (!ffake_panic)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
late_initcall(mce_debugfs_init);
#endif