Documentation/security-bugs: Clarify treatment of embargoed information

The Linux kernel security team has been accused of rejecting the idea of
security embargoes. This is incorrect, and could dissuade people from
reporting security issues to us under the false assumption that the
issue would leak prematurely.

Clarify the handling of embargoed information in our process
documentation.

Co-developed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Will Deacon 2018-10-22 16:39:01 +01:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 93048c0944
commit 14fdc2c531

View File

@ -26,23 +26,34 @@ information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
made public.
Disclosure
----------
Disclosure and embargoed information
------------------------------------
The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
submitter to understand and fix the bug. We prefer to publish the fix as
soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
and leave that to others.
The security list is not a disclosure channel. For that, see Coordination
below.
Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
coordination. However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
days, not weeks or months. A release date is negotiated by the security
team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors. However, the
kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe. The
timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)
to a few weeks. As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
release date to be on the order of 7 days.
Once a robust fix has been developed, our preference is to release the
fix in a timely fashion, treating it no differently than any of the other
thousands of changes and fixes the Linux kernel project releases every
month.
However, at the request of the reporter, we will postpone releasing the
fix for up to 5 business days after the date of the report or after the
embargo has lifted; whichever comes first. The only exception to that
rule is if the bug is publicly known, in which case the preference is to
release the fix as soon as it's available.
Whilst embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
reporter. This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
identity of the reporter.
In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed. All other
information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
lifted, in perpetuity.
Coordination
------------
@ -68,7 +79,7 @@ may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
message, though.
message if the reporter agrees.
Non-disclosure agreements
-------------------------