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keys: Handle there being no fallback destination keyring for request_key()

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When request_key() is called, without there being any standard process
keyrings on which to fall back if a destination keyring is not specified, an
oops is liable to occur when construct_alloc_key() calls down_write() on
dest_keyring's semaphore.

Due to function inlining this may be seen as an oops in down_write() as called
from request_key_and_link().

This situation crops up during boot, where request_key() is called from within
the kernel (such as in CIFS mounts) where nobody is actually logged in, and so
PAM has not had a chance to create a session keyring and user keyrings to act
as the fallback.

To fix this, make construct_alloc_key() not attempt to cache a key if there is
no fallback key if no destination keyring is given specifically.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells
2009-04-09 17:14:05 +01:00
committed by Linus Torvalds
parent 11ff5f6aff
commit 34574dd10b
1 changed files with 6 additions and 3 deletions
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9
security/keys/request_key.c
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@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags); set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
down_write(&dest_keyring->sem); if (dest_keyring)
down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need /* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
* to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
@@ -322,10 +323,12 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto key_already_present; goto key_already_present;
__key_link(dest_keyring, key); if (dest_keyring)
__key_link(dest_keyring, key);
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex); mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
up_write(&dest_keyring->sem); if (dest_keyring)
up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock); mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
*_key = key; *_key = key;
kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key)); kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));