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Bluetooth: Move some more elements to struct l2cap_chan

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In this commit sec_level, force_reliable, role_switch and flushable.

Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
This commit is contained in:
Gustavo F. Padovan
2011-04-12 18:31:57 -03:00
parent 77a74c7e08
commit 4343478f3a
3 changed files with 77 additions and 65 deletions
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78
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
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@@ -262,10 +262,12 @@ free:
kfree(chan);
}
static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct sock *sk)
static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
struct sock *sk = chan->sk;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) {
switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) {
switch (chan->sec_level) {
case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
return HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING_MITM;
case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
@@ -274,15 +276,15 @@ static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct sock *sk)
return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
}
} else if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001)) {
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_SDP;
if (chan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
chan->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_SDP;
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
if (chan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM;
else
return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
} else {
switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) {
switch (chan->sec_level) {
case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
return HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM;
case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
@@ -294,15 +296,14 @@ static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct sock *sk)
}
/* Service level security */
static inline int l2cap_check_security(struct sock *sk)
static inline int l2cap_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn;
struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(chan->sk)->conn;
__u8 auth_type;
auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(sk);
auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(chan);
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level,
auth_type);
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, chan->sec_level, auth_type);
}
u8 l2cap_get_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
@@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
if (!(conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE))
return;
if (l2cap_check_security(sk) && __l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
if (l2cap_check_security(chan) &&
__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
struct l2cap_conn_req req;
req.scid = cpu_to_le16(l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
req.psm = l2cap_pi(sk)->psm;
@@ -515,7 +517,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT) {
struct l2cap_conn_req req;
if (!l2cap_check_security(sk) ||
if (!l2cap_check_security(chan) ||
!__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
continue;
@@ -549,7 +551,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
rsp.scid = cpu_to_le16(l2cap_pi(sk)->dcid);
rsp.dcid = cpu_to_le16(l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
if (l2cap_check_security(sk)) {
if (l2cap_check_security(chan)) {
if (bt_sk(sk)->defer_setup) {
struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
rsp.result = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CR_PEND);
@@ -722,7 +724,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_unreliable(struct l2cap_conn *conn, int err)
list_for_each_entry(chan, &conn->chan_l, list) {
struct sock *sk = chan->sk;
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->force_reliable)
if (chan->force_reliable)
sk->sk_err = err;
}
@@ -867,14 +869,14 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
hci_dev_lock_bh(hdev);
auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(sk);
auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(chan);
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->dcid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA)
hcon = hci_connect(hdev, LE_LINK, dst,
l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level, auth_type);
chan->sec_level, auth_type);
else
hcon = hci_connect(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst,
l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level, auth_type);
chan->sec_level, auth_type);
if (IS_ERR(hcon)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hcon);
@@ -900,7 +902,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
if (l2cap_check_security(sk))
if (l2cap_check_security(chan))
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
} else
l2cap_do_start(chan);
@@ -1002,15 +1004,15 @@ static void l2cap_drop_acked_frames(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
del_timer(&chan->retrans_timer);
}
void l2cap_do_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
void l2cap_do_send(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2cap_pinfo *pi = l2cap_pi(sk);
struct hci_conn *hcon = pi->conn->hcon;
struct sock *sk = chan->sk;
struct hci_conn *hcon = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn->hcon;
u16 flags;
BT_DBG("sk %p, skb %p len %d", sk, skb, skb->len);
BT_DBG("chan %p, skb %p len %d", chan, skb, skb->len);
if (!pi->flushable && lmp_no_flush_capable(hcon->hdev))
if (!chan->flushable && lmp_no_flush_capable(hcon->hdev))
flags = ACL_START_NO_FLUSH;
else
flags = ACL_START;
@@ -1035,7 +1037,7 @@ void l2cap_streaming_send(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
put_unaligned_le16(fcs, skb->data + skb->len - 2);
}
l2cap_do_send(sk, skb);
l2cap_do_send(chan, skb);
chan->next_tx_seq = (chan->next_tx_seq + 1) % 64;
}
@@ -1087,7 +1089,7 @@ static void l2cap_retransmit_one_frame(struct l2cap_chan *chan, u8 tx_seq)
put_unaligned_le16(fcs, tx_skb->data + tx_skb->len - 2);
}
l2cap_do_send(sk, tx_skb);
l2cap_do_send(chan, tx_skb);
}
int l2cap_ertm_send(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
@@ -1130,7 +1132,7 @@ int l2cap_ertm_send(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
put_unaligned_le16(fcs, skb->data + tx_skb->len - 2);
}
l2cap_do_send(sk, tx_skb);
l2cap_do_send(chan, tx_skb);
__mod_retrans_timer();
@@ -2100,7 +2102,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hd
chan->ident = cmd->ident;
if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE) {
if (l2cap_check_security(sk)) {
if (l2cap_check_security(chan)) {
if (bt_sk(sk)->defer_setup) {
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT2;
result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
@@ -3805,17 +3807,19 @@ static int l2cap_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type)
/* Find listening sockets and check their link_mode */
read_lock(&l2cap_sk_list.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, node, &l2cap_sk_list.head) {
struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
if (sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN)
continue;
if (!bacmp(&bt_sk(sk)->src, &hdev->bdaddr)) {
lm1 |= HCI_LM_ACCEPT;
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->role_switch)
if (chan->role_switch)
lm1 |= HCI_LM_MASTER;
exact++;
} else if (!bacmp(&bt_sk(sk)->src, BDADDR_ANY)) {
lm2 |= HCI_LM_ACCEPT;
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->role_switch)
if (chan->role_switch)
lm2 |= HCI_LM_MASTER;
}
}
@@ -3867,19 +3871,21 @@ static int l2cap_disconn_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 reason)
return 0;
}
static inline void l2cap_check_encryption(struct sock *sk, u8 encrypt)
static inline void l2cap_check_encryption(struct l2cap_chan *chan, u8 encrypt)
{
struct sock *sk = chan->sk;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
return;
if (encrypt == 0x00) {
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) {
if (chan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) {
l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
l2cap_sock_set_timer(sk, HZ * 5);
} else if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
} else if (chan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
__l2cap_sock_close(sk, ECONNREFUSED);
} else {
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
if (chan->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
}
}
@@ -3908,7 +3914,7 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
if (!status && (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED ||
sk->sk_state == BT_CONFIG)) {
l2cap_check_encryption(sk, encrypt);
l2cap_check_encryption(chan, encrypt);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
continue;
}
@@ -4083,7 +4089,7 @@ static int l2cap_debugfs_show(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
batostr(&bt_sk(sk)->dst),
sk->sk_state, __le16_to_cpu(pi->psm),
pi->scid, pi->dcid,
pi->imtu, pi->omtu, pi->sec_level,
pi->imtu, pi->omtu, pi->chan->sec_level,
pi->mode);
}