rpcgss: krb5: expect a constant signalg value

We also only ever receive one value of the signalg, so let's not pretend
otherwise

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This commit is contained in:
J. Bruce Fields
2006-12-04 20:22:36 -05:00
committed by Trond Myklebust
parent e678e06bf8
commit 5eb064f939
2 changed files with 25 additions and 58 deletions

View File

@@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
if (sealalg == 0xffff)
goto out;
if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5)
goto out;
/* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per
key type, so a simple comparison is ok */
@@ -276,34 +278,20 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
/* compute the checksum of the message */
/* initialize the the cksum */
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
default:
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, buf,
ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, buf,
ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data,
md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto out;
}
break;
default:
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto out;
}