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[PATCH] audit: support for object context filters

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This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

 kernel/auditfilter.c           |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/auditsc.c               |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   18 +++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This commit is contained in:
Darrel Goeddel
2006-06-29 16:57:08 -05:00
committed by Al Viro
parent 3a6b9f85c6
commit 6e5a2d1d32
3 changed files with 82 additions and 1 deletions
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18
security/selinux/ss/services.c
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@@ -1848,12 +1848,17 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1875,6 +1880,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
if (!userdatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1882,6 +1888,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
if (!roledatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1889,6 +1896,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
if (!typedatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1897,6 +1905,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
break;
}
@@ -1949,6 +1959,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
without a match */
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@@ -1959,6 +1970,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
}
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@@ -1969,6 +1981,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
}
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@@ -1980,7 +1993,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
&ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL: