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CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the networking subsystem

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Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells
2008-11-14 10:39:10 +11:00
committed by James Morris
parent 19d65624d3
commit 8192b0c482
4 changed files with 14 additions and 10 deletions
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8
net/core/dev.c
View File

@ -2958,6 +2958,8 @@ static void dev_change_rx_flags(struct net_device *dev, int flags)
static int __dev_set_promiscuity(struct net_device *dev, int inc)
{
unsigned short old_flags = dev->flags;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
ASSERT_RTNL();
@ -2982,15 +2984,17 @@ static int __dev_set_promiscuity(struct net_device *dev, int inc)
printk(KERN_INFO "device %s %s promiscuous mode\n",
dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) ? "entered" :
"left");
if (audit_enabled)
if (audit_enabled) {
current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS,
"dev=%s prom=%d old_prom=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC),
(old_flags & IFF_PROMISC),
audit_get_loginuid(current),
current->uid, current->gid,
uid, gid,
audit_get_sessionid(current));
}
dev_change_rx_flags(dev, IFF_PROMISC);
}

8
net/core/scm.c
View File

@ -45,10 +45,10 @@
static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((creds->uid == current->uid || creds->uid == current->euid ||
creds->uid == current->suid) || capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((creds->gid == current->gid || creds->gid == current->egid ||
creds->gid == current->sgid) || capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
((creds->uid == current_uid() || creds->uid == current_euid() ||
creds->uid == current_suid()) || capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((creds->gid == current_gid() || creds->gid == current_egid() ||
creds->gid == current_sgid()) || capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;