security: introducing security_request_module
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability to call request_module(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
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#define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50 /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
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static int kmod_loop_msg;
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ret = security_kernel_module_request();
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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va_start(args, fmt);
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ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args);
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va_end(args);
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