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security: introducing security_request_module

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Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
new module into the kernel.  This can be a dangerous event if the process
able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
binary or the module binary.  This patch adds a new security hook to
request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
to call request_module().

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Paris
2009-08-13 09:44:57 -04:00
committed by James Morris
parent a8f80e8ff9
commit 9188499cdb
4 changed files with 25 additions and 0 deletions
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6
security/capability.c
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@@ -396,6 +396,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return 0;
}
static int cap_kernel_module_request(void)
{
return 0;
}
static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
return 0;
@@ -945,6 +950,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);