[PATCH] sanitize ->permission() prototype
* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask. * kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission() * sanitize ecryptfs_permission() * fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new MAY_... found in mask. The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9) folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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@@ -1859,8 +1859,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = {
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* /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
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* access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
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*/
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static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
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struct nameidata *nd)
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static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
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{
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int rv;
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@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ out:
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return ret;
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}
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static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
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static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
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{
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/*
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* sysctl entries that are not writeable,
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