[PATCH] sanitize ->permission() prototype

* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
  about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
  MAY_... found in mask.

The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)

folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This commit is contained in:
Al Viro
2008-07-15 21:03:57 -04:00
parent 1bd5191d9f
commit e6305c43ed
38 changed files with 74 additions and 87 deletions

View File

@@ -1859,8 +1859,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = {
* /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
* access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
*/
static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
struct nameidata *nd)
static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int rv;

View File

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ out:
return ret;
}
static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
/*
* sysctl entries that are not writeable,