[PATCH] sanitize ->permission() prototype

* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
  about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
  MAY_... found in mask.

The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)

folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This commit is contained in:
Al Viro
2008-07-15 21:03:57 -04:00
parent 1bd5191d9f
commit e6305c43ed
38 changed files with 74 additions and 87 deletions

View File

@@ -1516,9 +1516,9 @@ static int do_sysctl_strategy(struct ctl_table_root *root,
int op = 0, rc;
if (oldval)
op |= 004;
op |= MAY_READ;
if (newval)
op |= 002;
op |= MAY_WRITE;
if (sysctl_perm(root, table, op))
return -EPERM;
@@ -1560,7 +1560,7 @@ repeat:
if (n == table->ctl_name) {
int error;
if (table->child) {
if (sysctl_perm(root, table, 001))
if (sysctl_perm(root, table, MAY_EXEC))
return -EPERM;
name++;
nlen--;
@@ -1635,7 +1635,7 @@ static int test_perm(int mode, int op)
mode >>= 6;
else if (in_egroup_p(0))
mode >>= 3;
if ((mode & op & 0007) == op)
if ((op & ~mode & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC)) == 0)
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -1645,7 +1645,7 @@ int sysctl_perm(struct ctl_table_root *root, struct ctl_table *table, int op)
int error;
int mode;
error = security_sysctl(table, op);
error = security_sysctl(table, op & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
if (error)
return error;