[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma
Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Linus Torvalds
parent
d5fb34261d
commit
e6e5494cb2
@@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ struct mem_size_stats
|
||||
unsigned long private_dirty;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
__attribute__((weak)) const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats *mss)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
|
||||
@@ -158,22 +163,23 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats
|
||||
pad_len_spaces(m, len);
|
||||
seq_path(m, file->f_vfsmnt, file->f_dentry, "\n");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (mm) {
|
||||
if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk &&
|
||||
const char *name = arch_vma_name(vma);
|
||||
if (!name) {
|
||||
if (mm) {
|
||||
if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk &&
|
||||
vma->vm_end >= mm->brk) {
|
||||
pad_len_spaces(m, len);
|
||||
seq_puts(m, "[heap]");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
|
||||
vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) {
|
||||
|
||||
pad_len_spaces(m, len);
|
||||
seq_puts(m, "[stack]");
|
||||
name = "[heap]";
|
||||
} else if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
|
||||
vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) {
|
||||
name = "[stack]";
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
name = "[vdso]";
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (name) {
|
||||
pad_len_spaces(m, len);
|
||||
seq_puts(m, "[vdso]");
|
||||
seq_puts(m, name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
seq_putc(m, '\n');
|
||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user