Commit Graph

12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds
aefcf2f4b5 Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...
2019-09-28 08:14:15 -07:00
Wenwen Wang
03d1571d95 ACPI: custom_method: fix memory leaks
In cm_write(), 'buf' is allocated through kzalloc(). In the following
execution, if an error occurs, 'buf' is not deallocated, leading to memory
leaks. To fix this issue, free 'buf' before returning the error.

Fixes: 526b4af47f ("ACPI: Split out custom_method functionality into an own driver")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-09-02 23:17:22 +02:00
Matthew Garrett
f474e1486b ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
Disable it if the kernel is locked down.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 21:54:16 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
09c434b8a0 treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for more missed files
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

 - Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial
   scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-21 10:50:45 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
9ec6dbfbdc ACPI: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions
When calling debugfs functions, there is no need to ever check the
return value.  The function can work or not, but the code logic should
never do something different based on this.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-01-22 19:45:52 +01:00
zhong jiang
7e79a69273 ACPI: custom_method: remove meaningless null check before debugfs_remove()
debugfs_remove() has taken null pointer into account. So it is safe
to remove the check before debugfs_remove().

Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2018-09-10 12:46:51 +02:00
Joe Perches
447a5647c9 treewide: Align function definition open/close braces
Some functions definitions have either the initial open brace and/or
the closing brace outside of column 1.

Move those braces to column 1.

This allows various function analyzers like gnu complexity to work
properly for these modified functions.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Nicolin Chen <nicoleotsuka@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2018-03-26 11:13:09 +02:00
Lv Zheng
8b48463f89 ACPI: Clean up inclusions of ACPI header files
Replace direct inclusions of <acpi/acpi.h>, <acpi/acpi_bus.h> and
<acpi/acpi_drivers.h>, which are incorrect, with <linux/acpi.h>
inclusions and remove some inclusions of those files that aren't
necessary.

First of all, <acpi/acpi.h>, <acpi/acpi_bus.h> and <acpi/acpi_drivers.h>
should not be included directly from any files that are built for
CONFIG_ACPI unset, because that generally leads to build warnings about
undefined symbols in !CONFIG_ACPI builds.  For CONFIG_ACPI set,
<linux/acpi.h> includes those files and for CONFIG_ACPI unset it
provides stub ACPI symbols to be used in that case.

Second, there are ordering dependencies between those files that always
have to be met.  Namely, it is required that <acpi/acpi_bus.h> be included
prior to <acpi/acpi_drivers.h> so that the acpi_pci_root declarations the
latter depends on are always there.  And <acpi/acpi.h> which provides
basic ACPICA type declarations should always be included prior to any other
ACPI headers in CONFIG_ACPI builds.  That also is taken care of including
<linux/acpi.h> as appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> (drivers/pci stuff)
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> (Xen stuff)
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2013-12-07 01:03:14 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
9043a2650c The sweeping change is to make add_taint() explicitly indicate whether to disable
lockdep, but it's a mechanical change.
 
 Cheers,
 Rusty.
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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux

Pull module update from Rusty Russell:
 "The sweeping change is to make add_taint() explicitly indicate whether
  to disable lockdep, but it's a mechanical change."

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  MODSIGN: Add option to not sign modules during modules_install
  MODSIGN: Add -s <signature> option to sign-file
  MODSIGN: Specify the hash algorithm on sign-file command line
  MODSIGN: Simplify Makefile with a Kconfig helper
  module: clean up load_module a little more.
  modpost: Ignore ARC specific non-alloc sections
  module: constify within_module_*
  taint: add explicit flag to show whether lock dep is still OK.
  module: printk message when module signature fail taints kernel.
2013-02-25 15:41:43 -08:00
Zhang Rui
5baa1be1cf ACPI: fix obsolete comment in custom_method.c
The comment describing the contents of the custom_method.c file is
obsolete, so update it.

[rjw: Subject and changelog]
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2013-01-26 00:34:22 +01:00
Rusty Russell
373d4d0997 taint: add explicit flag to show whether lock dep is still OK.
Fix up all callers as they were before, with make one change: an
unsigned module taints the kernel, but doesn't turn off lockdep.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2013-01-21 17:17:57 +10:30
Thomas Renninger
526b4af47f ACPI: Split out custom_method functionality into an own driver
With /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method root can write
to arbitrary memory and increase his priveleges, even if
these are restricted.

-> Make this an own debug .config option and warn about the
security issue in the config description.

-> Still keep acpi/debugfs.c which now only creates an empty
   /sys/kernel/debug/acpi directory. There might be other
   users of it later.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: rui.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
2011-05-29 01:50:40 -04:00