Commit Graph

106 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tetsuo Handa
fe542cf59b LSM: Move security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() to after mutex_lock().
We should call security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() after mutex_lock()
in order to avoid races.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-11-24 08:49:26 +11:00
Tetsuo Handa
8b8efb4403 LSM: Add security_path_chroot().
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.

This hook is used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-12 10:56:02 +11:00
Tetsuo Handa
89eda06837 LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown().
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown()
operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *",
we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of
notify_change().

These hooks are used by TOMOYO.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-12 10:56:00 +11:00
Heiko Carstens
4fd8da8d62 fs: change sys_truncate length parameter type
For this system call user space passes a signed long length parameter,
while the kernel side takes an unsigned long parameter and converts it
later to signed long again.

This has led to bugs in compat wrappers see e.g.  dd90bbd5 "powerpc: Add
compat_sys_truncate".  The s390 compat wrapper for this functions is
broken as well since it also performs zero extension instead of sign
extension for the length parameter.

In addition if hpa comes up with an automated way of generating
compat wrappers it would generate a wrong one here.

So change the length parameter from unsigned long to long.

Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 09:21:05 -07:00
David Howells
e0e817392b CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]
Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management.  The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).

Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.

This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):

	http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:01 +10:00
Amerigo Wang
939a9421eb vfs: allow file truncations when both suid and write permissions set
When suid is set and the non-owner user has write permission, any writing
into this file should be allowed and suid should be removed after that.

However, current kernel only allows writing without truncations, when we
do truncations on that file, we get EPERM.  This is a bug.

Steps to reproduce this bug:

% ls -l rootdir/file1
-rwsrwsrwx 1 root root 3 Jun 25 15:42 rootdir/file1
% echo h > rootdir/file1
zsh: operation not permitted: rootdir/file1
% ls -l rootdir/file1
-rwsrwsrwx 1 root root 3 Jun 25 15:42 rootdir/file1
% echo h >> rootdir/file1
% ls -l rootdir/file1
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 5 Jun 25 16:34 rootdir/file1

Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-21 14:25:48 +10:00
Ankit Jain
3e63cbb1ef fs: Add new pre-allocation ioctls to vfs for compatibility with legacy xfs ioctls
This patch adds ioctls to vfs for compatibility with legacy XFS
pre-allocation ioctls (XFS_IOC_*RESVP*). The implementation
effectively invokes sys_fallocate for the new ioctls.
Also handles the compat_ioctl case.
Note: These legacy ioctls are also implemented by OCFS2.

[AV: folded fixes from hch]

Signed-off-by: Ankit Jain <me@ankitjain.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-24 08:15:27 -04:00
npiggin@suse.de
96029c4e09 fs: introduce mnt_clone_write
This patch speeds up lmbench lat_mmap test by about another 2% after the
first patch.

Before:
 avg = 462.286
 std = 5.46106

After:
 avg = 453.12
 std = 9.58257

(50 runs of each, stddev gives a reasonable confidence)

It does this by introducing mnt_clone_write, which avoids some heavyweight
operations of mnt_want_write if called on a vfsmount which we know already
has a write count; and mnt_want_write_file, which can call mnt_clone_write
if the file is open for write.

After these two patches, mnt_want_write and mnt_drop_write go from 7% on
the profile down to 1.3% (including mnt_clone_write).

[AV: mnt_want_write_file() should take file alone and derive mnt from it;
not only all callers have that form, but that's the only mnt about which
we know that it's already held for write if file is opened for write]

Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-11 21:36:02 -04:00
Al Viro
6e8341a11e Switch open_exec() and sys_uselib() to do_open_filp()
... and make path_lookup_open() static

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-05-09 10:49:42 -04:00
Al Viro
5ad4e53bd5 Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly.  sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:27 -04:00
Jan Kara
9e3509e273 vfs: Use lowercase names of quota functions
Use lowercase names of quota functions instead of old uppercase ones.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-26 02:18:35 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
6559eed8ca [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 30
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:30 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
3cdad42884 [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 20
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:26 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
ca013e945b [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 17
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:25 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
002c8976ee [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 16
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:25 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
a26eab2400 [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 15
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:24 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
3480b25743 [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 14
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:24 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
257ac264d6 [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 11
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:23 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
bdc480e3be [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 10
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:22 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
6673e0c3fb [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrapper special cases
System calls with an unsigned long long argument can't be converted with
the standard wrappers since that would include a cast to long, which in
turn means that we would lose the upper 32 bit on 32 bit architectures.
Also semctl can't use the standard wrapper since it has a 'union'
parameter.

So we handle them as special case and add some extra wrappers instead.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:18 +01:00
Al Viro
acfa4380ef inode->i_op is never NULL
We used to have rather schizophrenic set of checks for NULL ->i_op even
though it had been eliminated years ago.  You'd need to go out of your
way to set it to NULL explicitly _and_ a bunch of code would die on
such inodes anyway.  After killing two remaining places that still
did that bogosity, all that crap can go away.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-05 11:54:28 -05:00
Kentaro Takeda
be6d3e56a6 introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks.  Call them on directory-modifying
operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-31 18:07:37 -05:00
David Howells
d84f4f992c CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
David Howells
745ca2475a CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.

The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:22 +11:00
David Howells
b6dff3ec5e CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11:00
David Howells
1cdcbec1a3 CRED: Neuter sys_capset()
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.

This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.

This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:

 (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.

 (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:14 +11:00
Al Viro
aeb5d72706 [PATCH] introduce fmode_t, do annotations
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-10-21 07:47:06 -04:00
Alan Cox
2cb5998b5f tty: the vhangup syscall is racy
We now have the infrastructure to sort this out but rather than teaching
the syscall tty lock rules we move the hard work into a tty helper

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-13 09:51:41 -07:00
Al Viro
1027abe882 [PATCH] merge locate_fd() and get_unused_fd()
New primitive: alloc_fd(start, flags).  get_unused_fd() and
get_unused_fd_flags() become wrappers on top of it.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-01 11:25:23 -04:00
Al Viro
4e1e018ecc [PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling
* dup2() should return -EBADF on exceeded sysctl_nr_open
* dup() should *not* return -EINVAL even if you have rlimit set to 0;
  it should get -EMFILE instead.

Check for orig_start exceeding rlimit taken to sys_fcntl().
Failing expand_files() in dup{2,3}() now gets -EMFILE remapped to -EBADF.
Consequently, remaining checks for rlimit are taken to expand_files().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:45 -04:00
Al Viro
2d8f30380a [PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.
* do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want.
* switch to new helpers:
	user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path)
	user_path(pathname, &path)
	user_lpath(pathname, &path)
	user_path_dir(pathname, &path)  (fail if not a directory)
  The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one.
* remove nameidata in callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:34 -04:00
Al Viro
256984a838 [PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanup
Almost all users __user_walk_fd() and friends care only about struct path.
Get rid of the few that do not.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:32 -04:00
Al Viro
30524472c2 [PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that care
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:30 -04:00
Miklos Szeredi
beb29e058c [patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanup
Move the immutable and append-only checks from chmod, chown and utimes
into notify_change().  Checks for immutable and append-only files are
always performed by the VFS and not by the filesystem (see
permission() and may_...() in namei.c), so these belong in
notify_change(), and not in inode_change_ok().

This should be completely equivalent.

CC: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
CC: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:28 -04:00
Al Viro
a110343f0d [PATCH] fix MAY_CHDIR/MAY_ACCESS/LOOKUP_ACCESS mess
* MAY_CHDIR is redundant - it's an equivalent of MAY_ACCESS
* MAY_ACCESS on fuse should affect only the last step of pathname resolution
* fchdir() and chroot() should pass MAY_ACCESS, for the same reason why
  chdir() needs that.
* now that we pass MAY_ACCESS explicitly in all cases, LOOKUP_ACCESS can be
  removed; it has no business being in nameidata.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:21 -04:00
Al Viro
7f2da1e7d0 [PATCH] kill altroot
long overdue...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:20 -04:00
Al Viro
8bb79224b8 [PATCH] permission checks for chdir need special treatment only on the last step
... so we ought to pass MAY_CHDIR to vfs_permission() instead of having
it triggered on every step of preceding pathname resolution.  LOOKUP_CHDIR
is killed by that.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-26 20:53:19 -04:00
Miklos Szeredi
c82e42da8a [patch 1/5] vfs: truncate: dont check immutable twice
vfs_permission(MAY_WRITE) already checked for the inode being
immutable, so no need to repeat it.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2008-07-26 20:53:15 -04:00
Jon Tollefson
f4a67cceee fs: check for statfs overflow
Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is
checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that
it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0.

Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 10:47:19 -07:00
Andrew G. Morgan
086f7316f0 security: filesystem capabilities: fix fragile setuid fixup code
This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the
case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()).  The effect
of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing
securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is
configured.)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-04 10:40:08 -07:00
Al Viro
9f3acc3140 [PATCH] split linux/file.h
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-05-01 13:08:16 -04:00
Nick Piggin
70688e4dd1 xip: support non-struct page backed memory
Convert XIP to support non-struct page backed memory, using VM_MIXEDMAP for
the user mappings.

This requires the get_xip_page API to be changed to an address based one.
Improve the API layering a little bit too, while we're here.

This is required in order to support XIP filesystems on memory that isn't
backed with struct page (but memory with struct page is still supported too).

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Acked-by: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:23 -07:00
Dave Hansen
ad775f5a8f [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: debugging for missed calls
There have been a few oopses caused by 'struct file's with NULL f_vfsmnts.
There was also a set of potentially missed mnt_want_write()s from
dentry_open() calls.

This patch provides a very simple debugging framework to catch these kinds of
bugs.  It will WARN_ON() them, but should stop us from having any oopses or
mnt_writer count imbalances.

I'm quite convinced that this is a good thing because it found bugs in the
stuff I was working on as soon as I wrote it.

[hch: made it conditional on a debug option.
      But it's still a little bit too ugly]

[hch: merged forced remount r/o fix from Dave and akpm's fix for the fix]

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:28 -04:00
Dave Hansen
2f676cbc0d [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: make access() use new r/o helper
It is OK to let access() go without using a mnt_want/drop_write() pair because
it doesn't actually do writes to the filesystem, and it is inherently racy
anyway.  This is a rare case when it is OK to use __mnt_is_readonly()
directly.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:26 -04:00
Dave Hansen
9ac9b8474c [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: write counts for truncate()
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:25 -04:00
Dave Hansen
2af482a7ed [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: elevate write count for chmod/chown callers
chown/chmod,etc...  don't call permission in the same way that the normal
"open for write" calls do.  They still write to the filesystem, so bump the
write count during these operations.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:25 -04:00
Dave Hansen
4a3fd211cc [PATCH] r/o bind mounts: elevate write count for open()s
This is the first really tricky patch in the series.  It elevates the writer
count on a mount each time a non-special file is opened for write.

We used to do this in may_open(), but Miklos pointed out that __dentry_open()
is used as well to create filps.  This will cover even those cases, while a
call in may_open() would not have.

There is also an elevated count around the vfs_create() call in open_namei().
See the comments for more details, but we need this to fix a 'create, remount,
fail r/w open()' race.

Some filesystems forego the use of normal vfs calls to create
struct files.   Make sure that these users elevate the mnt
writer count because they will get __fput(), and we need
to make sure they're balanced.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:29:25 -04:00
Christoph Hellwig
a70e65df88 [PATCH] merge open_namei() and do_filp_open()
open_namei() will, in the future, need to take mount write counts
over its creation and truncation (via may_open()) operations.  It
needs to keep these write counts until any potential filp that is
created gets __fput()'d.

This gets complicated in the error handling and becomes very murky
as to how far open_namei() actually got, and whether or not that
mount write count was taken.  That makes it a bad interface.

All that the current do_filp_open() really does is allocate the
nameidata on the stack, then call open_namei().

So, this merges those two functions and moves filp_open() over
to namei.c so it can be close to its buddy: do_filp_open().  It
also gets a kerneldoc comment in the process.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:25:32 -04:00
Dave Hansen
d57999e152 [PATCH] do namei_flags calculation inside open_namei()
My end goal here is to make sure all users of may_open()
return filps.  This will ensure that we properly release
mount write counts which were taken for the filp in
may_open().

This patch moves the sys_open flags to namei flags
calculation into fs/namei.c.  We'll shortly be moving
the nameidata_to_filp() calls into namei.c, and this
gets the sys_open flags to a place where we can get
at them when we need them.

Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-19 00:25:31 -04:00
Roland McGrath
54a0151041 asmlinkage_protect replaces prevent_tail_call
The prevent_tail_call() macro works around the problem of the compiler
clobbering argument words on the stack, which for asmlinkage functions
is the caller's (user's) struct pt_regs.  The tail/sibling-call
optimization is not the only way that the compiler can decide to use
stack argument words as scratch space, which we have to prevent.
Other optimizations can do it too.

Until we have new compiler support to make "asmlinkage" binding on the
compiler's own use of the stack argument frame, we have work around all
the manifestations of this issue that crop up.

More cases seem to be prevented by also keeping the incoming argument
variables live at the end of the function.  This makes their original
stack slots attractive places to leave those variables, so the compiler
tends not clobber them for something else.  It's still no guarantee, but
it handles some observed cases that prevent_tail_call() did not.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-10 17:28:26 -07:00